The fact that many people also get away with un-falsifiable theories doesn't really doesn't justify introducing another, particularly blatant one. I mean, if the whole of reality is created by consciousness (or is a reflection of consciousness) then if (say) everybody could levitate for one day, then things returned to normal, all that could be said about this event would be that MAL was probably feeling a bit whimsical!
As I suggested above, I think when scientists postulate panpsychism, they are really just dipping their toes into non-materialist waters. I don't think they have a thought out position.
David
Look - I'm not saying that there aren't theories that
can be falsified. I'm saying that there are theories that are happily considered scientific that
can't be falsified. What is considered scientific has no necessary relationship with whether or not it's falsifiable. It could have more to do with whatever the scientific establishment is willing place its imprimatur on. Mentioning falsifiability may sometimes be a ruse to enable the exclusion of disfavoured theories, to prevent them from ever getting a seat at the table.
Do dark matter and energy really exist? Could their existence ever be disproved? Sans really substantial evidence for their existence (which would not, however,
prove their existence), I don't think so. And one must bear in mind that theories propose only
models of reality, not reality itself. At best, falsifiability can disprove only models, and models can rarely if ever be conclusively proved to be 100% empirically accurate. But even if that were the case, one wouldn't thereby prove that models
are reality.
For instance, there is a very strong correlation between mental activity and brain activity. However, which direction the causality goes is debatable. Materialists assert it goes in one direction, and idealists, the other. To make a personal choice, one has to turn to corroborative evidence, and increasingly, that evidence supports idealism more than materialism. Does that mean idealism is correct? No. But IMO it does mean that it's a better fit to empirical data.
Materialism and idealism, and also dualism, panpsychism and a dozen other -isms, are theoretical
models of reality, not reality itself. As I've said before, I find idealism the most persuasive model I've so far come across, the one that (again, IMO) intellectually, most satisfactorily, explains empirical evidence. But I don't make the mistake of declaring it correct; it's more that I haven't yet come across a better model. That could change tomorrow as far as I know.
And in that, I think we're getting nearer to what science is: not a search for truth that can be proved, but a search for models that better explain reality; and models are, in the end, only a sort of metaphor of reality. I wonder whether materialism can ever be completely disproved, because it does in fact have at least
some explanatory power. If and when it's dropped, as I said, I don't think that will be because it has been disproved: more likely, it will have become untenable to the point where it's no longer considered credible.
Incidentally, Jim, it's true that Einstein predicted the apparent displacement of stars during a stellar eclipse. But did that prove that his explanation for it was correct, i.e. that in the vicinity of a large massive body like the sun, space is bent? Maybe. Or maybe not. His idea of the curvature of space might model reality accurately enough to be able to predict certain phenomena without it actually being absolutely true. Space might not curve around stars: there conceivably might be some other explanation that could be tested for.
I'm not saying Einstein was wrong. I'm saying that he could in theory be wrong yet right enough to predict apparent stellar displacement. There's a precedence for this in Copernican heliocentrism. It's widely thought that this system dispensed with the need for epicycles, but actually, it didn't. The reason for that is that at the time,
it wasn't known that planetary orbits are elliptical rather than circular. Copernicus was only able to reduce the number of epicycles, not completely eliminate them. That had to await the later discovery of elliptical planetary orbits
Who knows -- there might be "epicycles" we are unaware of in relativity theory -- indeed in any theory -- however well supported by current empirical evidence a theory might appear to be. It pays to keep an open mind. By all means one can go with current evidence, but should never close the door on the possibility of new evidence arising. Never go so far as to actively exclude new ideas mainly because one doesn't want them to get a fair hearing -- and I think that Popper facilitated that.
In your longish quote, he contrasts Freudianism, Adlerianism and Marxism with Einstein's relativity, which is on the face of it fair enough. But dig a little deeper and contrast theories that are at least equally plausible, but where one doesn't fit in with current paradigms. Why should one theory receive better, or even exclusive, attention and funding? Why was plate tectonics rejected for so long? Not because it wasn't plausible, but because it was dismissed out of court before being given serious consideration. OTOH, why has Darwinism been so ferociously promoted for so long? Does it have anything to do with falsifiability? If it had, I think it would have been rejected long ago.
Popper created a tool that would enable scientists to arbitrarily exclude from consideration whatever they wanted. Just claim something one doesn't agree with is unfalsifiable and bingo, it isn't science. Meanwhile, and hypocritically, pursue unfalsifiable theories treating them as if they
are science.