Are there any paranormal phenomena AT ALL??

I don't agree. It reflects the kinds of investigations which are performed, not that they are performed under the auspices of parapsychology. Any time you are investigating a talented individual, other causes for the results would be considered. Parapsychology investigates talented individuals who happen to look like they are performing magic tricks. When investigations involve experiments on larger numbers of subjects, then the same suspicions which fall on mainstream researchers fall on to parapsychologists - making up results, undisclosed flexibility, hiding some of the results. There's plenty of that in non-parapsychology research.

Linda

Linda,

Actually I agree with you. Comparing the Higgs to Uri Geller bending a spoon (which I don't necessarily buy, just don't trust the guy) isn't fair. Comparing the Higgs to some of Dean Radin's work and say Daryll Bem's work is more fair, but still apples and oranges. I probably didn't set up some of the best comparisons.

But, I think the main point I was driving at is pretty incontestable and obvious, which was in my reply to Paul:

Anytime you have modeling and simulation, which is all over the physics world ... things can be rigged.

My point was, parapsychologists don't get nearly the level of trust your regular run-of-the-mill scientist gets

And like I said, I don't think in many cases (Radin, Bem, Stevenson, etc) this is warranted at all.
 
But, I think the main point I was driving at is pretty incontestable and obvious, which was in my reply to Paul:

And like I said, I don't think in many cases (Radin, Bem, Stevenson, etc) this is warranted at all.

I think the problem is that parapsychologists do get the same level of trust as your regular run-of-the-mill scientist. I don't think people realize the level of mistrust which permeates science because we are already intimately familiar with the ways in which the system is gamed in our own fields. The discrepancy isn't between how Radin, Bem and Stevenson are treated in comparison. The discrepancy is in how you think others are treated.

I suspect that the average scientist running across something by Radin or Bem is going to suspect them of the same kinds of shennigans that they see others in their field using in order to obtain 'significant' results. And the problem is that Radin and Bem make it too easy to call "shenanigans". As far as I know, Bem has never owned up to the exploratory nature of at least some of the studies he published in "Feeling the Future", nor the size of the pool from which he selected those studies. Radin overtly engages in selective outcome reporting. Bem presents a meta-analysis where half of the included studies are "personal communication". That's how drug companies go about making their useless or dangerous products look good, so it's not a surprise that scientists will roll their eyes in this case as well.

I think Johann and Maaneli are on the right track (if I've understood Johann's description correctly) with respect to getting the kinds of results regular run-of-the-mill scientists are used to seeing. I'm looking forward to seeing their paper on the subject.

Linda
 
..........We all construct models of reality that have certain boundaries. That which we think is reality is actually a model of reality. The strongest evidence is actually always personal experience, because, as I've said previously, never for a moment in our entire lives do we step outside our own personal consciousness. Those who have never personally experienced the paranormal (I'm one of them) are faced with an existential choice about whether or not to make room for it in their model of reality. My personal choice is agnosticism with a leaning towards its existence; but others may completely embrace or completely reject it.

If we could all recognise that we have our models of reality and that those models could be wrong, then we could have genuinely productive discussions. We'd be open to such evidence as was available, and prepared, at least in principle, to amend our models--in other words, to change our preferred storylines. Sounds easy, but actually, our storylines are an integral part of what we consider ourselves to be. Changing the story can be exceedingly traumatic, and extraordinary claims can often be translated as I'm not prepared to entertain that, because going there would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the model, and I can't allow that to happen.

I'm not having a go solely at sceptics: this applies to everyone. There are psi proponents who can be just as closed to evidence as some sceptics.

I'm curious. Why is personal experience necessarily the "gold standard" arbiter of the belief system held by a person? All it takes is to have such a stake in or worship of the intellect that absolutely no experience could lead to certainty. For the rational mind there will always be uncertainty, ambiguity, doubt. The intellect can always doubt and say that the NDE or other personally experienced paranormal event may have really been a hallucination, no matter how deep or emotionally powerful it was. After all, the rational mind knows that ultimately the only thing we can be certain of is that we exist as a conscious awareness. All else could be deception and illusion.
 
I'm curious. Why is personal experience necessarily the "gold standard" arbiter of the belief system held by a person? All it takes is to have such a stake in or worship of the intellect that absolutely no experience could lead to certainty. For the rational mind there will always be uncertainty, ambiguity, doubt. The intellect can always doubt and say that the NDE or other personally experienced paranormal event may have really been a hallucination, no matter how deep or emotionally powerful it was. After all, the rational mind knows that ultimately the only thing we can be certain of is that we exist as a conscious awareness. All else could be deception and illusion.

I'm struggling a bit to see your point, NB. First, I'm just stating a fact: so long as we are alive, we are constrained within our personal consciousness. I'm not passing judgement about whether that's the "gold standard": I'm saying it's self-evident, and that nothing whatsoever that we experience comes to us except through personal consciousness. Whether, within that consciousness, we evaluate something as true, false, uncertain, doubtful or whatever, is a different issue. The sum total of all the opinions and beliefs we hold about the world constitutes our model of it, and the precise composition of that model is unique to each of us. The world, ostensibly out there, is actually in here, and it's only got there after having been filtered to some degree or other.

What adds to my confusion is what you say in the two sentences I have bolded. Yes, I agree, and thought I had more or less implied the same thing. So where exactly is your difference? Forgive me if I'm just being a bit dense.
 
I think the problem is that parapsychologists do get the same level of trust as your regular run-of-the-mill scientist. I don't think people realize the level of mistrust which permeates science because we are already intimately familiar with the ways in which the system is gamed in our own fields. The discrepancy isn't between how Radin, Bem and Stevenson are treated in comparison. The discrepancy is in how you think others are treated.

I'll tell you what Linda. You take Aharonov, Tegmark and Thorne. I'll take only Dean Radin.

We'll each get a nickle when we can find someone who considers our assigned scientist(s) a "peddler of woo" and we'll see who gets rich quicker.
 
I'll tell you what Linda. You take Aharonov, Tegmark and Thorne. I'll take only Dean Radin.

We'll each get a nickle when we can find someone who considers our assigned scientist(s) a "peddler of woo" and we'll see who gets rich quicker.

Huh? As far as I can tell you've picked three well-respected scientists who perform good quality research and have proposed coherent and consistent ideas supported by decent evidence (or at least, not contradicted by evidence). In contrast you have Radin whose studies are generally of poor to fair quality (or at high risk of bias, per these criteria - http://hiv.cochrane.org/sites/hiv.cochrane.org/files/uploads/Ch08_Bias.pdf) who has proposed generally incoherent and inconsistent ideas which are ill-supported (sometimes frankly contradicted) by evidence. Yet you are surprised that the two groups are regarded differently? How about picking someone more comparable to Radin for contrast?

Linda
 
Huh? As far as I can tell you've picked three well-respected scientists who perform good quality research and have proposed coherent and consistent ideas supported by decent evidence (or at least, not contradicted by evidence). In contrast you have Radin whose studies are generally of poor to fair quality (or at high risk of bias, per these criteria - http://hiv.cochrane.org/sites/hiv.cochrane.org/files/uploads/Ch08_Bias.pdf) who has proposed generally incoherent and inconsistent ideas which are ill-supported (sometimes frankly contradicted) by evidence. Yet you are surprised that the two groups are regarded differently? How about picking someone more comparable to Radin for contrast?
Linda

w/e Linda, you're trying to sell the same BS whenever you talk about parapsychology which illustrates my point perfectly

You missed that I picked scientists who deal in retro-causality, math as a platonic reality and wormholes, far out ideas, none of which are supported by evidence, or even 100% by theory
 
I'm struggling a bit to see your point, NB. First, I'm just stating a fact: so long as we are alive, we are constrained within our personal consciousness. I'm not passing judgement about whether that's the "gold standard": I'm saying it's self-evident, and that nothing whatsoever that we experience comes to us except through personal consciousness. Whether, within that consciousness, we evaluate something as true, false, uncertain, doubtful or whatever, is a different issue. The sum total of all the opinions and beliefs we hold about the world constitutes our model of it, and the precise composition of that model is unique to each of us. The world, ostensibly out there, is actually in here, and it's only got there after having been filtered to some degree or other.


What adds to my confusion is what you say in the two sentences I have bolded. Yes, I agree, and thought I had more or less implied the same thing. So where exactly is your difference? Forgive me if I'm just being a bit dense.


Perhaps it was my confusion, over your words, "Those who have never personally experienced the paranormal (I'm one of them) are faced with an existential choice about whether or not to make room for it in their model of reality." The implication of this seemed to be that the converse must then be the case, that those who have experienced the paranormal have no choice but to include it in their model of reality.

My point of view is that to the strictly rational mind no experience whatsoever could conclusively show the real existence of the paranormal - such an experience would always be dismissed as possibly a hallucination, glitch of the brain or some other deception. I guess you agree with this. I personally haven't had a compelling paranormal experience, and if I did part of me might still question it along these lines. Is this response to personal experience an aberration of a too dominant intellect, or is it just the inevitable, irreducible ambiguity of existence?
 
Perhaps it was my confusion, over your words, "Those who have never personally experienced the paranormal (I'm one of them) are faced with an existential choice about whether or not to make room for it in their model of reality." The implication of this seemed to be that the converse must then be the case, that those who have experienced the paranormal have no choice but to include it in their model of reality.

My point of view is that to the strictly rational mind no experience whatsoever could conclusively show the real existence of the paranormal - such an experience would always be dismissed as possibly a hallucination, glitch of the brain or some other deception. I guess you agree with this. I personally haven't had a compelling paranormal experience, and if I did part of me might still question it along these lines. Is this response to personal experience an aberration of a too dominant intellect, or is it just the inevitable, irreducible ambiguity of existence?
Thanks for clarifying, NB. I don't think those who have experienced the paranormal necessarily always accept it: they too have an existential choice, I suppose. I think of someone like Sam Harris, who by his own admission has taken psychedelics and had the usual kinds of experiences. He has chosen to reject the possibility that they are indicative of the paranormal, however. And I dare say that many people who've experienced strange things choose to dismiss them rather than taking them on board.

As to your second para, I think you misapply the word "rational", implying that rationality, however strict, necessarily excludes acceptance of paranormal phenomena. I think plenty of highly rational people accept them. The derivation of the word "rational" from the Online Etymological Dictionary is:

late 14c., "endowed with reason," from L. rationalis "of or belonging to reason, reasonable," from ratio (gen. rationis) "reckoning, calculation, reason" (see ratio). Rationalist "physician whose treatment is based on reason" is from 1620s; applied to a philosophical doctrine

If reason is applied to evaluation of a phenomenon, then we're talking rationality. That reason isn't tied to the metaphysic of philosophical naturalism, though ever since the Enlightenment, the claim has been that only that metaphysic is worthy of consideration.

I think you're also, mistakenly, contrasting intellect with acceptance of the paranormal, as if people of high intellect automatically reject the possibility of its existence. That's simply untrue. Some highly rational and intellectual physicists, for example Schrodinger and Heisenberg, were by all accounts open to such a possibility.

Your point about "irreducible ambiguity" has some force, at least for me: I'm inclined to accept the paranormal, though ultimately have to declare myself agnostic. But for others, particularly those who have had paranormal experiences, they may opine that there's no longer that ambiguity: and there's no way to prove or disprove that they're correct. That said, absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence, and I think the mistake of philosophical naturalism is to arbitrarily define reality as that which its methods can investigate. When confronted with strong counter-evidence that is the result of applying its own methods, its clearly metaphysical nature shines through: evidence doesn't actually matter. What matters is the metaphysic itself, applied as a matter of principle; and to my way of thinking, that's the epitome of irrationality.
 
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I think the problem is that parapsychologists do get the same level of trust as your regular run-of-the-mill scientist. I don't think people realize the level of mistrust which permeates science because we are already intimately familiar with the ways in which the system is gamed in our own fields. The discrepancy isn't between how Radin, Bem and Stevenson are treated in comparison. The discrepancy is in how you think others are treated.

I think it's not impossible for a reasonable skeptic to reject the strong narrative of orthodoxy/heterodoxy that is frequently presented here, while still accepting that fringe researchers face obstacles unlike those of their mainstream colleagues, some of which operate independently of the level of evidence those researchers amass. This is not a revolutionary idea, nor does it require any remarkable speculation; on the contrary, it follows directly from well-understood principles in sociology and such evidence as it has been possible to acquire.

I am privy to the information, for example, that a fairly mainstream outlet had agreed to devote an entire research area of one of its journals to the publication of works on parapsychology, only later to rescind its invitation with a minimum of consideration for the scientists involved. The research area had been open for several months, during which a couple parapsychologists had managed to solicit the participation of dozens of high-profile contributors, before it was cancelled without any explanation. When its authors were unable to locate their venue they contacted said parapsychologists, who in turn contacted the chief editors of the journal and waited two weeks for a reply. After it finally came, the management claimed the topic had never received approval from certain chief editors who had opposed it from the beginning; cited the fact that it would detract from the prestige of their journal; and then explained that, in reality, the erection of the research area had been an "anomaly", and had been posted accidentally.

I say this affected by no small amount of dislike, for on the one hand I really would like to expose this particular journal's base level of scientific ethical misconduct—perhaps even cowardice—but on the other, I am restrained by the fact that those of us who know about the incident have been enjoined to reveal no specifics, in order that psi papers continue to be allowed publication there.

I have also mentioned, on several previous occasions, that there are at least three very high-profile physicists interested in psi research who will not reveal their identities lest their careers suffer as a result.

I suspect that the average scientist running across something by Radin or Bem is going to suspect them of the same kinds of shennigans that they see others in their field using in order to obtain 'significant' results. And the problem is that Radin and Bem make it too easy to call "shenanigans". As far as I know, Bem has never owned up to the exploratory nature of at least some of the studies he published in "Feeling the Future", nor the size of the pool from which he selected those studies.

As I recall, we only had suggestive evidence for this. If I see Bem at the PA conference this year, I will be sure to ask him about that. You were correct in suggesting that Bem would not reply to my email, BTW, but then again his inbox probably contains a great deal of unread and unconsidered emails.

Bem presents a meta-analysis where half of the included studies are "personal communication". That's how drug companies go about making their useless or dangerous products look good, so it's not a surprise that scientists will roll their eyes in this case as well.

I've looked at the MA; the references show eight studies were personally communicated out of more than 50 considered. If you were treating all non-peer reviewed studies as personal communication, that may have been the source of your mistake, but if you'll notice (1) the MA included a comparison between the two categories of study, finding that their ES's had substantially overlapping 95% CIs, and thus were not significantly different from each other and (2) a whole raft of Moulton's negative psi studies were never peer reviewed, but nevertheless made it into the MA because of its efforts to combat publication bias. Personal communication is one way a researcher can avoid taking mainstream journals' unreliable pool of published studies at face value.

I think Johann and Maaneli are on the right track (if I've understood Johann's description correctly) with respect to getting the kinds of results regular run-of-the-mill scientists are used to seeing. I'm looking forward to seeing their paper on the subject.

One of the things our paper emphasizes, with respect, is that the results found in parapsychology are the kinds of results regular run-of-the-mill scientists are used to seeing—but that they can also get better.

I would like to take the opportunity, also, to dispel the notion that Maaneli and I have been conducting psi experiments (as someone speculated here). Unfortunately, it is not so. Our power predictions derive primarily from Maaneli's work exploring the most successful results of prior meta-analyses (with a history of consistency which we document), and a series of straightforward calculations. Making use of moderator variables, we can significantly boost power.

An example of a strong moderator variable for psi is participant selection; in Storm et al. (2010), Honorton & Ferrari (1984), and Storm et al. (2012), studies with selected participants have considerably higher ES values than studies with unselected participants, and this finding has held even for the Milton & Wiseman database. Honorton's three-predictor model, as well, produced hit rates in excess of 40% in two prospective replications, one independent. Studies with creative subjects across the ganzfeld show a proportion of more than 40% hits too. These sorts of observations suggest a route to amplifying power by more than double what it is now. It's really no more complicated than that.
 
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The skeptics on the forum have been saying for years that if selected populations like artists are thought to provide greater hit rates then parapsychologists should just focus on using those populations for awhile.

I posted a paper awhile back that looked at that question and seemed to conclude that overall such populations did not fare better. I'm sure you guys have it but let me know if you don't and I can try and find it again.
 
The skeptics on the forum have been saying for years that if selected populations like artists are thought to provide greater hit rates then parapsychologists should just focus on using those populations for awhile.

I posted a paper awhile back that looked at that question and seemed to conclude that overall such populations did not fare better. I'm sure you guys have it but let me know if you don't and I can try and find it again.
I missed that. Was it on this forum or the old one? What would I search for?

Cheers,
Bill
 
The skeptics on the forum have been saying for years that if selected populations like artists are thought to provide greater hit rates then parapsychologists should just focus on using those populations for awhile.

I don't think it's just the skeptics on the forum that have been saying that. And ganzfeld research takes place on the scale of decades.

I posted a paper awhile back that looked at that question and seemed to conclude that overall such populations did not fare better.

Please produce it again, if you can, but I'm afraid it isn't a disputable point. Selected populations in the ganzfeld, especially artists, blood relatives, and emotionally close, have empirically fared over-and-above unselected populations—it's in the hit rates (indeed, across the Gz, the "average" hit rate of 32% can actually be seen as a lucky, almost meaningless composite of the scores of selected subjects and unselected participants).

Holt's 2007 PA conference paper may be what you're thinking of, but notice that it never contests the claim that artistic populations have fared better in the ganzfeld than unselected populations. On the contrary, it obtains a hit rate for its artistic population that is commensurate with previous hit rates (43%), although the sample size was just 15, and the other 15 non-artistic participants, still ESP conducive, actually scored a little higher (47%). The conclusion of that paper is not that artistic populations have failed to outperform unselected subjects, but that we can't be sure whether it is actually creativity itself (and not a whole host of other confounding variables) which influences psi-hitting. It may well be that what allows artistic subjects superior performance is the conjunction of many psi-conducive traits, not cognitive flexibility, for example.

But while this is intriguing information for a process-oriented approach, our paper takes a proof-oriented route; if these selected populations have consistently outperformed unselected subjects, it doesn't matter why—as long as they remain roughly homogenous, future studies should still be able to replicate the findings.
 
I missed that. Was it on this forum or the old one? What would I search for?

Cheers,
Bill

The old forum for sure. Can't recall about this one. You might be able to find some by me if you search Arouet and "selected", or "artists".
 
I don't think it's just the skeptics on the forum that have been saying that. And ganzfeld research takes place on the scale of decades.



Please produce it again, if you can, but I'm afraid it isn't a disputable point. Selected populations in the ganzfeld, especially artists, blood relatives, and emotionally close, have empirically fared over-and-above unselected populations—it's in the hit rates (indeed, across the Gz, the "average" hit rate of 32% can actually be seen as a lucky, almost meaningless composite of the scores of selected subjects and unselected participants).

Holt's 2007 PA conference paper may be what you're thinking of, but notice that it never contests the claim that artistic populations have fared better in the ganzfeld than unselected populations. On the contrary, it obtains a hit rate for its artistic population that is commensurate with previous hit rates (43%), although the sample size was just 15, and the other 15 non-artistic participants, still ESP conducive, actually scored a little higher (47%). The conclusion of that paper is not that artistic populations have failed to outperform unselected subjects, but that we can't be sure whether it is actually creativity itself (and not a whole host of other confounding variables) which influences psi-hitting. It may well be that what allows artistic subjects superior performance is the conjunction of many psi-conducive traits, not cognitive flexibility, for example.

But while this is intriguing information for a process-oriented approach, our paper takes a proof-oriented route; if these selected populations have consistently outperformed unselected subjects, it doesn't matter why—as long as they remain roughly homogenous, future studies should still be able to replicate the findings.

Yes, I believe it was the Holt paper: http://www.academia.edu/695143/Are_..._and_psi_with_an_experience-sampling_protocol
 
The old forum for sure. Can't recall about this one. You might be able to find some by me if you search Arouet and "selected", or "artists".
Thanks, but I was afraid it would be on the old forum. We lost a lot of good links there. Even if you find a thread in google cache, you only get one page, then the "next" page links of course don't work. Let us know if you find it.

Cheers,
Bill
 
Thanks, but I was afraid it would be on the old forum. We lost a lot of good links there. Even if you find a thread in google cache, you only get one page, then the "next" page links of course don't work. Let us know if you find it.

Cheers,
Bill


Here's one:

Arouet;n115060 said:
Be smug all you want, I'm trying to approach this honestly.

I don't think anyone disagrees that the history of science has shown that we can't know if we have identified all confounding factors. Does anyone?

I don't think anyone disagrees that small confounding factors have a greater relative impact when the staistical significance is smaller than when its larger. Does anyone?

And no one seems to disagree that isolating the variable we are interested in is an effective way of neutralising the possible impact of the unidentified confounding variables.

This points me to the conclusion that for Ganzfeld we should be trying to come up with a protocol that effectively does the latter. And if we can't, then I think we have to be cautious in accepting the results of the studies as indicating psi.


I'm playing around with the idea that the artist vs-non-artist difference may be a way to go. Here's an experiment where they pursued this and didn't find statistical significance. Are artistic populations ?psi-conducive?? Testing the relationship between creativity and psi with an experience-sampling protocol. (Nicola Jane Holt) - Academia.edu

And of course we'd have to rule out that the artists with superior obervational skills are not picking up on something (ie: if there is a difference, I wonder if police detectives would perform similarly - but this gets into trying to remove all confounding factors). Just musing on this.

And yes I know that there have been some GZ that did either focus on artists (I think Dalton did it), or post-hoc found that artists did better. But I'm not sure if Dalton had a non-artist control group or outside of this guy have then done artist vs non artist as the experimental protocol.
 
I think it's not impossible for a reasonable skeptic to reject the strong narrative of orthodoxy/heterodoxy that is frequently presented here, while still accepting that fringe researchers face obstacles unlike those of their mainstream colleagues, some of which operate independently of the level of evidence those researchers amass. This is not a revolutionary idea, nor does it require any remarkable speculation; on the contrary, it follows directly from well-understood principles in sociology and such evidence as it has been possible to acquire.

I am privy to the information, for example, that a fairly mainstream outlet had agreed to devote an entire research area of one of its journals to the publication of works on parapsychology, only later to rescind its invitation with a minimum of consideration for the scientists involved. The research area had been open for several months, during which a couple parapsychologists had managed to solicit the participation of dozens of high-profile contributors, before it was cancelled without any explanation. When its authors were unable to locate their venue they contacted said parapsychologists, who in turn contacted the chief editors of the journal and waited two weeks for a reply. After it finally came, the management claimed the topic had never received approval from certain chief editors who had opposed it from the beginning; cited the fact that it would detract from the prestige of their journal; and then explained that, in reality, the erection of the research area had been an "anomaly", and had been posted accidentally.

I say this affected by no small amount of dislike, for on the one hand I really would like to expose this particular journal's base level of scientific ethical misconduct—perhaps even cowardice—but on the other, I am restrained by the fact that those of us who know about the incident have been enjoined to reveal no specifics, in order that psi papers continue to be allowed publication there.

I have also mentioned, on several previous occasions, that there are at least three very high-profile physicists interested in psi research who will not reveal their identities lest their careers suffer as a result.

I do not doubt that researchers in a field whose validity is not regarded as established have a more difficult time of it - in terms of getting their work published or drawing new researchers into the field, for example. And I suspect their practices are likely to be scrutinized more closely, than the practices of someone working in a mundane field. I think the differences between the level of suspicion directed at regular-run-of-the-mill scientists and parapsychologists has more to do with not caring whether a researcher is getting a free-pass, if their research is mundane.

I've looked at the MA; the references show eight studies were personally communicated out of more than 50 considered.

I was frustrated by trying to do a meta-analysis for precognitive habituation and finding that of the 17 studies listed (excluding Bem's 3), less than half (7) had results which were available for scrutiny in any way. Most were "personal communication" and the rest were results which have never been made public. And looking at the report as a whole, about 19 of 51 of the sources do not offer information which can be obtained publicly (i.e. even with institutional access), making even those which aren't listed as "personal communication" effectively so.

If you were treating all non-peer reviewed studies as personal communication, that may have been the source of your mistake,...

I didn't make a mistake, but I wasn't clear. I was referring to meta-analyses on individual experiments (some of which included a lot of "personal communication") and not just the meta-meta-analysis.

...but if you'll notice (1) the MA included a comparison between the two categories of study, finding that their ES's had substantially overlapping 95% CIs, and thus were not significantly different from each other and (2) a whole raft of Moulton's negative psi studies were never peer reviewed, but nevertheless made it into the MA because of its efforts to combat publication bias. Personal communication is one way a researcher can avoid taking mainstream journals' unreliable pool of published studies at face value.

Yes, but it also makes it impossible for an interested reader to assess the risk of bias, and since the risk of bias has been high, in at least some of these studies, it's hard to have any confidence in studies you have no info on.

One of the things our paper emphasizes, with respect, is that the results found in parapsychology are the kinds of results regular run-of-the-mill scientists are used to seeing—but that they can also get better.

I would like to take the opportunity, also, to dispel the notion that Maaneli and I have been conducting psi experiments (as someone speculated here). Unfortunately, it is not so. Our power predictions derive primarily from Maaneli's work exploring the most successful results of prior meta-analyses (with a history of consistency which we document), and a series of straightforward calculations. Making use of moderator variables, we can significantly boost power.

An example of a strong moderator variable for psi is participant selection; in Storm et al. (2010), Honorton & Ferrari (1984), and Storm et al. (2012), studies with selected participants have considerably higher ES values than studies with unselected participants, and this finding has held even for the Milton & Wiseman database. Honorton's three-predictor model, as well, produced hit rates in excess of 40% in two prospective replications, one independent. Studies with creative subjects across the ganzfeld show a proportion of more than 40% hits too. These sorts of observations suggest a route to amplifying power by more than double what it is now. It's really no more complicated than that.

Did you get any sense of why parapsychologists haven't already been consistently doing this for the last 20 years? Do you discuss ways in which to bring down the risk of bias, as well?

Linda
 
What about the findings from the ganzfeld meta-analysis done by Ersby, Maaneli and Johann (I think) looking at selected and unselected subjects, which was on a more complete pool. Weren't they considerably attenuated?

Linda
 
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