So you think you have free will

The next time you blindly satisfy a food craving you will now know after the deed is done that it was the bacterial puppet masters that made you do it.

And if I resist the feeling did I use my own free will to do so? Or was that some other isolated part of the human form? And if the "I" is nothing more than a war between neurons, gut bacteria, and whatever other clumps of cells you're dividing identity into, isn't odd this combination of clumps possesses rationality, subjectivity, and intentionality? (More on this here.)

Of course Rosenberg says under materialist-based natrualism rationality, intentionality, and even semantics are ultimately illusions, whereas Feser suggests this erasure of meaning/understanding is good reason to doubt such a paradigm.

Non-theist criticisms of Rosenberg I've not yet read:

Michael Ruse, Philip Kitcher, and Massimo Pigliucci.

Sure you can say no to the craving and sometimes you do, but there are other times when you just can't stop yourself from stuffing the ol' piehole.

Eating disproves free will?

On a slightly serious note such research as this does not favor absolute free will.

I figured there'd be a pitch for compatabilism?
 
It's not like your gut bacteria are collectively holding a gun to your head, demanding that you eat your probiotics or whatever else they want that day. I look at it more like a friend suggesting you go out for dinner with him on a Friday night. If you go with him, that doesn't somehow prove you don't have free will. Sure, he can influence you to do so by mentioning that it's all you can eat night, but the final decision still rests with you.

Now, I'd like to get back to discussing just what exactly "you" are instead of discussing whether or not free will is a thing.
 
Just read Carrier's conclusions on Rosenberg's essay and find they pretty closely resemble my views.

This piece? -> Rosenberg on Naturalism

I finished the reviews by Massimo, Ruse, and Kitcher as well. Seems like there are some interesting points in all the criticsms, but it's not clear to me anyone rescued naturalism from Rosenberg's conclusions - though I suppose Massimo has his Mathematical Platonism to fall back on. But then Massimo apparently leans toward all reality being made from Platonic Math, which leads to him penning an amusing (ironic?) post criticizing Idealism....anyway, a subject for a future thread.

eta: Carrier is a philosopher? That's disappointing, given the varied weaknesses in his rebuttal...
 
Last edited by a moderator:
I think we're "just" the silent observer and that everything else is just content. I base this on experience: my seven year old self died; my 21 year old self died, my past political, etc., selves died. Sure, some vague memories remain, but I'm doubtful that those vague memories are really "me." I think it's worth pointing out that nothing that can die - generally things we can label and reduce to words - ever ends up being missed.
 
Is the negation of free will suppose to be a selling point for the materialist faith?

I mean, if we don't choose what we believe, aren't all the shaming tactics of the materialist evangelist toothless?

I think it depends. Certain definitions of free will are compatible with materialism ( like compatibilism!) while other forms ( like Libertarian Free Will) aren't compatible with materialism. On the other hand however, I don't think Libertarian Free Will (LFW) is compatible with any worldview, because I think it's incoherent, so even if you are as far as possible of materialism (idealism?) you still wouldn't be able to hold to LFW in a rational way.
 
Seems like compatibilism has to acknowledge no one chooses to believe one thing or another, so there's no reason to be proud or ashamed of holding particular beliefs.

Not that I've seen a version of compatibilism that reads well - I know Flew rejected it but I haven't yet found the paper(s) where he explains how his idea of free will works. I think Harris has also said he doesn't think compatibilism is workable?
 
Seems like compatibilism has to acknowledge no one chooses to believe one thing or another, so there's no reason to be proud or ashamed of holding particular beliefs.

Free will has more to with actions that with beliefs. one can believe in X, but "choose" to do Y, on free will. In compatibilism, one is free in the sense that you are the one who ultimately do stuff, which is pretty obvious if you think about it (same way as Huricanne Katrina caused many problems in the USA a few years ago). At the end, it doesn't seem to me much about if the view is or isn't workable, but about definition and what is one willing to consider "free". Under certain views, the issue isn't even a proposable problem. Free will implies one is free of something, usually of "prescriptive" rules that govern the universe, however, if all there is are descriptions (in a descriptive view of physical laws), what is one supposed to be free of?, ¿of a definition of reality? hardly possible or tennable, making the problem trivial at best or non-existent at worst.

Not that I've seen a version of compatibilism that reads well - I know Flew rejected it but I haven't yet found the paper(s) where he explains how his idea of free will works. I think Harris has also said he doesn't think compatibilism is workable?

An absolute view of free will ( the libertarian free will), can be easily shown to be false, IMHO. Consider the following scenario: You are in front of two shirts, and you need to go to hang with your bros, so you need to choose one. Say you choose red. Libertarian free will would imply that you choosed this apart from any sort of interference or predetermination.

Now, imagine you could "re-wind" time back to the same spot: everything, including you, are the same: same atoms in the same place, same will, same desires, etc. Libertarian Free Will tell us the scenario should change if you rewind it many times, otherwise the red shirt decision would be determined. However, if everything is the same and you choose blue, your decision was ultimately random.
 
Oh I'm familiar with the general arguments for/against compatibilism/libertarianism. Like Imperial Philosopher says it's rather boring after you do a few passes through it all, though I think it'd be a mistake to assume what is or isn't possible under immaterialism. As McGinn notes, mental causation may not follow the same relationships physical causation seemingly does. And there's all that hylemorphism jazz Feser talks about...

Ideally Flew will provide new insights into this topic if I can track his work down given he rejected compatibilism, argued for a different definition of free will, and accepted the reality of God - in that order. I'd have though[t] it'd be reject compatibilism -> accept God -> believe in free will so I'm curious to follow the train of his reasoning.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Oh I'm familiar with the general arguments for/against compatibilism/libertarianism. Like Imperial Philosopher says it's rather boring after you do a few passes through it all, though I think it'd be a mistake to assume what is or isn't possible under immaterialism.

Unless one wish to declare immaterialism is an irrational or incoherent view, I think it's right to assume it must follow the laws of logic. So, if Libertarian Free Will is incoherent, and immaterialism is coherent, then immaterialism can't allow for libertarian free will.

As McGinn notes, mental causation may not follow the same relationships physical causation seemingly does. And there's all that hylemorphism jazz Feser talks about...

It still needs to follow logic, though.

Ideally Flew will provide new insights into this topic if I can track his work down given he rejected compatibilism, argued for a different definition of free will, and accepted the reality of God - in that order. I'd have though[t] it'd be reject compatibilism -> accept God -> believe in free will so I'm curious to follow the train of his reasoning

I've never put much stock in Feser, but it might make an interesting read.
 
Searle had a Google Tech Talk where he mentioned he didn't see the determinism or indeterminism as the only possible options. Will track it down later.

On the last sentence of your post, that was Flew not Feser I was referring to.
 
Now, imagine you could "re-wind" time back to the same spot: everything, including you, are the same: same atoms in the same place, same will, same desires, etc. Libertarian Free Will tell us the scenario should change if you rewind it many times, otherwise the red shirt decision would be determined. However, if everything is the same and you choose blue, your decision was ultimately random.

Imagining rewind you assuming these mechanics, spatial causality, which is precisely what prevents free will, but it is what has to be proven.
 
Well, I just read the part he put in the original article (that looks like the expanded one), but yes.

You're talking about in the objections to Rosenberg's essay? Which ones? (I don't think I've read anything else of carrier's)

His whole attempt to dance around the Is-Ought Problem seemed like word games to me. Similar to his attempt to argue for pseudo-objective morality.
 
Will tell us the scenario should change if you rewind it many times, otherwise the red shirt decision would be determined. However, if everything is the same and you choose blue, your decision was ultimately random.

This is why I tend to just ignore the free will debate; under free will denial, all possible outcomes from a given event are claimed as proof that free will is bunk. Unfortunately, proper science* requires there at least two possible outcomes in any given study. So taking a binary choice (red or blue shirt) and claiming that both shirts prove your point means the example is unfalsifiable and thus invalid. At this point one might as well invoke Descartes' demon.

Like Imperial Philosopher says it's rather boring after you do a few passes through it all, though I think it'd be a mistake to assume what is or isn't possible under immaterialism.

I agree with this. Free-will skeptics can almost be counted on to eventually bring up the "heads I win tails you loose" vignette, in the exact same fashion that they complain woosters bring up the "why is there something rather than nothing" question.
 
Searle had a Google Tech Talk where he mentioned he didn't see the determinism or indeterminism as the only possible options. Will track it down later.

On the last sentence of your post, that was Flew not Feser I was referring to.

Doesn't seem possible at all, since A and not-A cover all the options, same as determinism and non-determinism ( or indeterminism) cover them. Of course "not-A" or "indeterminism" might have many varieties, but they will invariably be part of the groupo "not-A". Woudl love to see the google talk though.
 
Back
Top