I'm sympathetic to Idealism, but the bolded part here seems an extremely convenient piece of circular special pleading. But, granted, it is a beautiful way to armour the model against falsification. I am reminded of the Young Earth Creationist who insists that dinosaur bones happen to present an appearance of being much older than six thousand years, but have been placed there to model an older earth.
I think you might misunderstand the mainstream view; It is entirely consistent with Hoffman's talk. A model of reality is not considered as actual reality. Everything we experience, our entire awareness, is a representation, an illusion. This is why the colour example is so important to understand as a first step. Our entire reality is our experience - this is a point of agreement between ontologies. However, the nagging question remains: Is that experience all there is or is there "stuff" outside of that experience (as it appears)? I wonder if it's a little early to discount that possibility?
Heh. We both see circular reasoning I guess. I haven't met any materialists who deny QM so I'm not sure what you mean by concrete reality?
Here's a simple test for an Idealist, qualia as fundamental, model. Under that model we have, as often quoted, "the redness of red"; it is an experience, a fundamental of shared consciousness. Now an idealist would deny that the red experience comes from an interaction with external wavelengths of light (indeed, you have just done this). Yet we have significant individuals who suffer from deuteranopia, and do not "experience" redness to any degree, if at all in extreme cases. It's curious that a fundamental component of shared experience looks less fundamental and less shared than we might have expected. We also have solid detailed biological and histological explanations of how these anomalies occur and it involves the direct interaction between wavelengths of light interacting with central nervous system cells.
Yes, no model is complete. We have to assess the merits, usefulness and completeness of all competing models if we want to play this game.
I think you might misunderstand the mainstream view; It is entirely consistent with Hoffman's talk. A model of reality is not considered as actual reality. Everything we experience, our entire awareness, is a representation, an illusion. This is why the colour example is so important to understand as a first step. Our entire reality is our experience - this is a point of agreement between ontologies. However, the nagging question remains: Is that experience all there is or is there "stuff" outside of that experience (as it appears)? I wonder if it's a little early to discount that possibility?
Heh. We both see circular reasoning I guess. I haven't met any materialists who deny QM so I'm not sure what you mean by concrete reality?
Here's a simple test for an Idealist, qualia as fundamental, model. Under that model we have, as often quoted, "the redness of red"; it is an experience, a fundamental of shared consciousness. Now an idealist would deny that the red experience comes from an interaction with external wavelengths of light (indeed, you have just done this). Yet we have significant individuals who suffer from deuteranopia, and do not "experience" redness to any degree, if at all in extreme cases. It's curious that a fundamental component of shared experience looks less fundamental and less shared than we might have expected. We also have solid detailed biological and histological explanations of how these anomalies occur and it involves the direct interaction between wavelengths of light interacting with central nervous system cells.
Yes, no model is complete. We have to assess the merits, usefulness and completeness of all competing models if we want to play this game.
