Honestly, I feel like I am rambling, and I don't even know if this is related to anything 'on-topic' or worth talking about anymore. It feels more like a linguistic exercise. Am I just explaining something simple in a needlessly complicated way? Probably :)
I think I understand perfectly well what you're getting at, and in the end, I think it's key to the discussion of whether the paranormal exists. In one storyline, it doesn't, and in another, it does. Or maybe in one it can't, in the other it can. Or you can use words like
might or
should or
shouldn't: there may be different nuances, and the thing is, the quality of the evidence is quite often subsidiary to a prior predilection (this can apply equally to proponents and sceptics).
This predilection may be actively denied, or people may simply be unaware that they have one. It's the source of statements like "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence". Well actually, no. All claims require the same standards of evidence. It's not unheard of for certain claims that are widely accepted, or at least favoured by scientific elites, to have lowered standards of evidence, and for those elites to bend over backwards to aver, at least in public, stories that, ironically, may be published and so, strictly speaking, aren't anecdotes. Whether or not something is published doesn't bear a necessary relationship with the truth of the matter. "Peer reviewed" isn't a guarantee that something is true: it could actually be false, mistaken, or even fraudulent: we can all come up with examples of dodgy research, and there is increasing concern, perhaps particularly in medicine, that much if not the majority of published research is wrong.
On top of that, there are claims that are officially sanctioned, and which claims are or aren't is often a matter of fashion. Generally, the closer one's predilections are to what's in fashion, the more
correct one feels one is. But the fact of the matter is that there's no such thing as
correct except in mathematics, where strict rules of logic are applied and it can be incontrovertibly demonstrated whether or not a particular proof or equation complies with those rules. But the rules of mathematics, in the end, however useful they are, are a human invention. The storyline of mathematics, particularly in the physical sciences, is that if a mathematical model has a degree of predictive or explanatory power (the more accurate the prediction the better), then that's the strongest possible evidence that the model is correct. Well no: that's not actually true, the classic example being Newtonian physics. In due course, post-Newtonian physics may come in for refinements of its own. The maths of Newtonian or post-Newtonian physics will continue to be useful depending on the area of application, even if the model is (one might well say, inevitably,
when it is) completely abandoned.
We all construct models of reality that have certain boundaries. That which we think is reality is actually a
model of reality. The strongest evidence is actually always personal experience, because, as I've said previously, never for a moment in our entire lives do we step outside our own personal consciousness. Those who have never personally experienced the paranormal (I'm one of them) are faced with an existential choice about whether or not to make room for it in their model of reality. My personal choice is agnosticism with a leaning towards its existence; but others may completely embrace or completely reject it.
If we could all recognise that we have our models of reality and that those models could be wrong, then we could have genuinely productive discussions. We'd be open to such evidence as was available, and prepared, at least in principle, to amend our models--in other words, to change our preferred storylines. Sounds easy, but actually, our storylines are an integral part of what we consider ourselves to be. Changing the story can be exceedingly traumatic, and
extraordinary claims can often be translated as
I'm not prepared to entertain that, because going there would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the model, and
I can't allow that to happen.
I'm not having a go solely at sceptics: this applies to everyone. There are psi proponents who can be just as closed to evidence as some sceptics.