Michael, you might be a little shocked by this post. I have seen fit to respond specifically to almost every single point that you made, and you made a lot of them. I am not invested in any response that you might make in turn, all I am interested in is
whether you (or anybody else) can
genuinely challenge me on the general thrust of my argument - according to my own judgement, of course, which, naturally, might not reflect yours or anybody else's in this thread.
Good, evil, omnipotence: these are words that reflect mens' thoughts about the world. Men can conceive of a being able to do anything it desires without restriction, and when it doesn't generate only what they think of as good, they wonder why it created evil.
I only wonder why it created evil on the assumption that it is not only omnipotent but
omnibenevolent too. It seems contradictory that an all-powerful
and totally good being
would produce evil, and thus it is more than a mere "thought about the world", it is a matter of
reason... and I am pretty sure that we are all posting under the guise of being reasonable.
This is a polar view: we have the words "good" and "evil" and see them as complete opposites. However, I recall Idries Shah saying that good and evil intertwine: which I interpret as meaning that good can give rise to evil, and evil to good.
Sure, imperfect, fallible beings who try to do good might inadvertently do evil, but not a perfect and infallible God. But is that the type of God ("mind at large") in whom you believe?
Take something like Hiroshima. Was that evil or good?
In absolute terms, it was utterly evil. You frame it in relative, consequentialist terms, as a matter of "the lesser evil", and, of course, we can all understand
pragmatism, but it
is only relative, and, ultimately, we have to refer to an ideal to know what is
absolutely good, and thus what is
absolutely evil.
Wherein lies good and evil? Is it in intent, or effect?
I'd say whether good or evil is in intent or effect depends on context. It might be either, neither, or both.
That apparently the world contains evil can be used as an argument against God's omnipotence, for sure. But what if the world is designed by an omnipotent being to offer a specific kind of experience to us (and thereby Itself) -- the one we're having, warts and all? One where we can learn, evolve, become wiser?
But what
need would an omnipotent being have to learn, evolve, and become wiser? Omnipotence includes the power to know all (omniscience), and so, as you point out later, an omnipotent being could only learn, evolve, and become wiser if S/He were to
deliberately cripple Him/Herself. Why would an omnipotent being cripple Him/Herself into
suffering though? Surely, an omnipotent being who sought to constrain Him/Herself could think of infinitely many more satisfying and
pleasurable ways to do so than those which we experience in this reality?
Of course, not all that we think of as evil appears to be generated by us. There are volcanic eruptions, tornadoes, being eaten by crocodiles, disease, and all manner of natural disasters. If an omnipotent God created the possibility of those, then is He capable of evil? Does He have to battle against some other deity that champions evil? I don't buy into such a Manichaeistic view, which I think is the personification of good and evil, seen as opposites rather than complementaries.
You ask a couple of (very pertinent!) questions, which you imply you have good reason to answer in the negative... but then you abandon any pretence at reason, and merely assert an opinion. This is unconvincing.
Why, indeed, Michael, if an omnipotent God created the possibility of natural disasters, would we
not consider Him to be capable of evil? And if we are to try to
justify the existence of the evil of natural disasters, then how
else are we to do this than by positing that God, whilst being good, is
not omnipotent, but is
opposed by a counterpart who
seeks such "natural" evils?
Let's not forget: the idea of God is distinct from the idea of God's creation. If we detect what we think of as flaws in creation, that doesn't say anything about God Himself.
Really? Jesus's view seems more apposite to me: "By their fruits shall you know them".
For all we know, creation as we experience it might be absolutely perfect for His purposes.
Sure, if His purposes are not wholly good... but then we're no longer talking about an omnibenevolent God.
Intrinsic to this is the veiling, in ordinary circumstances, of knowledge from us -- and thereby, Him? If we think of God as omnipotent, perhaps that should include the possibility of His coming to know something new and interesting to Him, or knowing something (through us?) in a novel way.
Omnipotence is somewhat at odds with omniscience. If God is Omnipotent and omniscient, then what purpose could creation possibly have? By creating, God would consciously be deceiving Himself, consciously pretending He didn't know things and pretending to be interested and excited by them. He'd just be playing games.
I've responded to these sentiments above. To reiterate: putting aside the question of whether an omnipotent (and, presumably, perfect) being would have any genuine (absolute) motive or *desire* to introduce ignorance and imperfection into His/Her reality, even if ostensibly to experience a (false) ability to learn new things, why on Earth would S/He concoct a means of doing so which involves so much
suffering? Surely, an omnipotent being could conceive of "a self-deceptive game of learning" which was entirely
fun and
pleasurable? There seems to be no
need for evil and suffering in His/Her self-deceiving game.
But let's step back and evaluate: if God
could have created a fun game for Him/Herself, but somehow didn't, and it turns out instead to be a "game" full of suffering, then what can we deduce from this?
Suddenly, the Manichaean idea seems tenable: suffering comes from
somewhere, and, if it doesn't come from
God (since there is no plausible reason for God to introduce suffering into His/Her own game), then...
Whilst I lean towards God's omnipotence, I don't think He's necessarily omniscient. In fact, if He were omnipotent, then it would be paradoxical to insist that He couldn't come to know anything new, or something in a new and interesting way.
But it wouldn't be paradoxical. Omnipotence is typically understood to be the power to do anything that is
logically possible, whereas coming to know something new when you are omniscient is
not logically possible.
The rest of your post simply elaborates, under the framework of Bernardo's idealism, on the idea of "mind at large" (essentially, an omnipotent and good God, entailing a sort of pseudo-Christianity or at least pseudo-monotheism) deceiving itself out of its omniscience so that it might have the
apparent experience of genuine discovery. I have already addressed all of this above (twice), but to recap (again): in particular, it is entirely implausible that an omnipotent and good God ("mind at large") would
not be capable of devising a game of self-deception (assuming it could even plausibly desire such a thing) that was free from suffering, and entirely fun and pleasurable for itself, as it "discovered" "new" things.
