Carrol, Novella vs Alexander, Moody

The Plausibility of Substance Dualism as an Approach to the Mind-Body Problem: A Philosophical and Theological Inquiry

Interesting paper, read it over the last few days. Sadly I think Chapter I: The Case for Dualism is probably weaker than Chapters II & III which respectively deal with physicalist positions and attempted refutations to dualism. I didn't go through Chapter IV as the theological implications are less interesting to me. Perhaps I'll get to it in time.

Dualism seems like a good explanatory position for some underlying monism but the philosophical issues seem, IMO, to be insurmountable.

Haha, regarding K-pop, I watched this video

the first time I really tripped by brains out on oral DMT. I was in the borderlands between this dimension and something else, and I kid you not, I actually became them and their thighs. I was screaming and ranting nonstop to my trip-sitter that I didn't need to incarnate as them in another life, because I already was them. Needless to say, that changed my view on K-pop forever ;)

Wa$$up, (와썹) - Hotter than a Summer

Korean reggae....sometimes you just have to love globalization...
 
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The Plausibility of Substance Dualism as an Approach to the Mind-Body Problem: A Philosophical and Theological Inquiry

Interesting paper, read it over the last few days. Sadly I think Chapter I: The Case for Dualism is probably weaker than Chapters II & III which respectively deal with physicalist positions and attempted refutations to dualism. I didn't go through Chapter IV as the theological implications are less interesting to me. Perhaps I'll get to it in time.

Dualism seems like a good explanatory position for some underlying monism but the philosophical issues seem, IMO, to be insurmountable.

I think it is interesting that two of the most distinguished neuroscientists of the 20th century - Wilder Penfield and Sir John Eccles - strongly supported the dualist view that a non-material mind coexists with a material brain. This conclusion was arrived at least in part through their experience in investigating and observing the brain and consciousness, not just through philosophical reasoning.

Wilder Penfield was a neurosurgeon and neurological researcher who performed hundreds of operations mainly on epileptic patients. He expressed his dualist position most forcefully in his last book, The Mystery of the Mind. Penfield rejected materialist (and presumably neutral) monism in favor of interactive dualism. He wrote:
"For my own part, after years of striving to explain the mind on the basis of brain-action alone, I have come to the conclusion that it is simpler (and far easier to be logical) if one adopts the hypothesis that our being does consist of two fundamental elements. Because it seems to me certain that it will always be quite impossible to explain the mind on the basis of neuronal action within the brain, and because it seems to me that the mind develops and matures independently throughout an individual's life as though it were a continuing element, and because a computer (which the brain is) must be programmed and operated by an agency capable of independent understanding, I am forced to choose the proposition that our being is to be understood on the basis of two elements. This, to my mind, offers the greatest likelihood of leading us to the final understanding [for] which so many stalwart scientists strive."

In Penfield's brain stimulation experiments during surgery on epileptic patients, whatever the "I" was, it didn't seem to be one and the same with the neural structures he stimulated, or the perceptual results of the stimulation:

"When I have caused a conscious patient to move his hand by applying an electrode to the motor cortex of one hemisphere, I have often asked him about it. Invariably his response was: ‘I didn’t do that. You did.’ When I caused him to vocalize, he said: ‘I didn’t make that sound. You pulled it out of me.’ When I caused the record of the stream of consciousness to run again and so presented to him the record of his past experience, he marveled that he should be conscious of the past as well as of the present. He was astonished that it should come back to him so completely, with more detail than he could possibly recall voluntarily. He assumed at once that, somehow, the surgeon was responsible for the phenomenon, but he recognized the details as those of his own past experience."

It is interesting that Penfield went on to note that “There is no place in the cerebral cortex where electrical stimulation will cause a patient . . . to decide” . This is consistent with the view that choices are undetermined events with a teleological explanation. In other words that there is free will.

Another famous neuroscientist who believed that the mind is immaterial was Sir John C. Eccles. He and the widely respected philosopher of science Sir Karl Popper wrote a book entitled The Self and Its Brain in which they argued that the human mind is best understood along interactionist dualist lines (the mind and brain are separate entities that causally interact).
 
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Feser had some intriguing posts that seek to refute Paul Churchland's criticisms of the philosophical position:

Part 1 + Part 2 + Part 3 + Part 4 + Part 5

Read the above in conjunction with the materialist Lycan's Giving Dualism Its Due.

My materialism has never wavered. Nor is it about to waver now; I cannot take dualism very seriously.

Being a philosopher, of course I would like to think that my stance is rational, held not just instinctively and scientistically and in the mainstream but because the arguments do indeed favor materialism over dualism. But I do not think that, though I used to. My position may be rational, broadly speaking, but not because the arguments favor it: Though the arguments for dualism do (indeed) fail, so do the arguments for materialism. And the standard objections to dualism are not very convincing; if one really manages to be a dualist in the first place, one should not be much impressed by them. My purpose in this paper is to hold my own feet to the fire and admit that I do not proportion my belief to the evidence.<3>

Lycan makes euphemisms to immaterial matter like 'spookstuff', showing potential misunderstanding of dualist philosophy. Feser deals with a few other misconceptions Lycan has about dualist philosopher's actual conceptions of a soul, but it is interesting that Lycan notes that the choice between dualism and materialism is based on faith.
 
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Lycan's paper is certainly interesting. His partial solution to the interaction problems seems to make the immaterial mind entirely material. I don't know what it means for an immaterial thing to occupy space with and interact with a physical thing: What keeps the immaterial thing immaterial? Of course, he does say "... even now we have no good model at all for Cartesian interaction."

~~ Paul
 
Lycan's paper is certainly interesting. His partial solution to the interaction problems seems to make the immaterial mind entirely material. I don't know what it means for an immaterial thing to occupy space with and interact with a physical thing: What keeps the immaterial thing immaterial? Of course, he does say "... even now we have no good model at all for Cartesian interaction."

~~ Paul

Yeah, I have to dig up Feser's central arguments. Lycan is still talking about some kind of "ectoplasm" while Feser argues this is a mistaken understanding about what dualists are arguing for.

Though Feser is not, as per my understanding, a Cartesian dualist.
 
Read the above in conjunction with the materialist Lycan's Giving Dualism Its Due.

Lycan makes euphemisms to immaterial matter like 'spookstuff', showing potential misunderstanding of dualist philosophy. Feser deals with a few other misconceptions Lycan has about dualist philosopher's actual conceptions of a soul, but it is interesting that Lycan notes that the choice between dualism and materialism is based on faith.

Continuing this theme, mentioned this on another thread but seems better placed here:

Mohrhoff's The Physics of Interactionism

Physics has been invoked both to refute and to support psycho-physical interactionism, the view that mind and matter are two mutually irreducible, interacting domains. Thus it has been held against interactionism that it implies violations of the laws of physics, notably the law of energy conservation. I examine the meaning of conservation laws in physics and show that in fact no valid argument against the interactionist theory can be drawn from them. In defence of interactionism it has been argued that mind can act on matter through an apparent loophole in physical determinism, without violating physical laws. I show that this argument is equally fallacious. This leads to the conclusion that the indeterminism of quantum mechanics cannot be the physical correlate of free will; if there is a causally efficacious non-material mind, then the behaviour of matter cannot be fully governed by physical laws. I show that the best (if not the only) way of formulating departures from the ‘normal’, physically determined behaviour of matter is in terms of modifications of the electromagnetic interactions between particles. I also show that mental states and events are non-spatial, and that departures from the ‘normal’ behaviour of matter, when caused by mental events, are not amenable to mathematical description.
 
I have a hard time getting past certain aspects of debates like this, to the point that as hard as I try, I can barely watch them. That Carroll demands a cure for Alzheimers as proof of consciousness post-death yet calls the source of that desired information "a blob of spirit energy that drives us around like a soccer mom" produces a warning indication in every fiber of my being that I'm listening to this argument from the wrong perspective. Just as I think atheism vs theism is too lofty an argument, I think survival vs. non-survival should wait until we've gotten past at least proving psychic perceptions among the living.

If would try to explain non-local consciousness to a person not informed about the research, I would start with hard-proven ESP and PK (general topics in academic parapsychology), then get to the survival-related stuff (afterlife-related research in academic parapsychology, near-death studies), than to spiritual experience (transpersonal psychology), than to philosophical issues, than to spiritual teaching and practices.

It is important to make one step in a time. If you start with transpersonal stuff from the very beginning, you will probably be dismissed as a "wishful thinker beleiving in hallucinations". You should begin with the hardest evidence possible, and add "softer" material gradually.
 
If would try to explain non-local consciousness to a person not informed about the research, I would start with hard-proven ESP and PK (general topics in academic parapsychology), then get to the survival-related stuff (afterlife-related research in academic parapsychology, near-death studies), than to spiritual experience (transpersonal psychology), than to philosophical issues, than to spiritual teaching and practices.

It is important to make one step in a time. If you start with transpersonal stuff from the very beginning, you will probably be dismissed as a "wishful thinker beleiving in hallucinations". You should begin with the hardest evidence possible, and add "softer" material gradually.

The problem is that atheist-skeptics will look at hard evidence, and then still not be convinced. They will delude themselves in whatever way they can so that they don't have to deal with the terrors of an afterlife. There is a tonne of evidence to support the obvious conclusion that atheist-skeptics can never be convinced. They could be confronted by demonic entities with glowing red eyes, and still convince themselves that they are hallucinating. Atheist-skeptics are unreliable observers.

By definition, an atheist-skeptic is hardwired to believe that paranormal phenomena has to be fraud, delusion, deception on the part of anyone who is convinced of it. There are whopping blind spots and self-deceptive practices on the part of atheist-skeptics. They are never "on the fence", "open-minded skeptic" or "just waiting for convincing evidence". Atheist-skeptics are deluded, even fearful of the paranormal.
 
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If would try to explain non-local consciousness to a person not informed about the research, I would start with hard-proven ESP and PK (general topics in academic parapsychology), then get to the survival-related stuff (afterlife-related research in academic parapsychology, near-death studies), than to spiritual experience (transpersonal psychology), than to philosophical issues, than to spiritual teaching and practices.

It is important to make one step in a time. If you start with transpersonal stuff from the very beginning, you will probably be dismissed as a "wishful thinker beleiving in hallucinations". You should begin with the hardest evidence possible, and add "softer" material gradually.

I agree with that, but I wouldn't go anywhere near these topics initially.

I think at first I would try and explain Lands work on colour perception, then optical illusions, and then perhaps dreams without objective sensory data. All in an effort to get the person to move to a new position of indirect perception. This is an absolutely crucial starting position in my view, otherwise you interpret all the data from the wrong perspective.

If I got them that far, I'd probably move to Green's work on Metachoric hallucinations (apparitional type experiences, negative and positive hallucinations), then OBE's, NDE's, DBV's etc... showing they are all reasonably explained as aspects of indirect perception. Then perhaps introduce EM theories of consciousness.

Then I'd want to go back to the science, showing EM, E & M field effects in brains, gene expression, centrioles, cell to cell communications, microtubules etc.

Finally I'd want to come back to time, space matter and energy... and think about what these things really are...
 
The problem is that atheist-skeptics will look at hard evidence, and then still not be convinced. They will delude themselves in whatever way they can so that they don't have to deal with the terrors of an afterlife. There is a tonne of evidence to support the obvious conclusion that atheist-skeptics can never be convinced. They could be confronted by demonic entities with glowing red eyes, and still convince themselves that they are hallucinating. Atheist-skeptics are unreliable observers.

By definition, an atheist-skeptic is hardwired to believe that paranormal phenomena has to be fraud, delusion, deception on the part of anyone who is convinced of it. There are whopping blind spots and self-deceptive practices on the part of atheist-skeptics. They are never "on the fence", "open-minded skeptic" or "just waiting for convincing evidence". Atheist-skeptics are deluded, even fearful of the paranormal.

I meant the persons not informed of the actual research of nonlocal consciousness, and expressing mild-to-moderate skepticism. I did not meant hardcore skeptics, whether informed or uninformed ones. Most of the latter are hopeless cases - one is strongly warned not to waste their time with them.
 
I meant the persons not informed of the actual research of nonlocal consciousness, and expressing mild-to-moderate skepticism. I did not meant hardcore skeptics, whether informed or uninformed ones. Most of the latter are hopeless cases - one is strongly warned not to waste their time with them.
I'll have to take that to heart.
 
New Scientist: Near-death experiences are overwhelmingly peaceful

There are several hypothesises as to how these events arise, such as lack of oxygen to the brain or damage to areas that control emotion. "So you'd expect to see differences between near-death experiences after drowning and those of other traumas," he says.

His team looked at 190 documented events that resulted from traumas including cardiac arrest, drowning, head injury and high anxiety. Using statistical analysis and a measurement called the Greyson scale to assess the number and intensity of different features of the near-death experiences, the team discovered that surprisingly, the reports shared many similarities.

Laureys is aware of the difficulties in investigating something so subjective, but is trying to tackle the subject with an open mind. "We need to accept there are many things we don't understand, but it's important to apply the best scientific method we can" he says. "It's a first step in understand something that is really interesting and could ultimately provide a better understanding of consciousness."

eta: Also check out the Quantum Soul thread in C&S for Stapp's contention that a soul is compatible with physics in addition to work in philosophy of mind which includes the materialist Lycan admitting that the choice between dualism or materialism is one of faith.
 
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That New Scientist article is quite interesting, not because it offers any great insights, but because it seems fairly neutral and accepting of the NDE as a phenomenon to be studied, rather than dismissed.
It's unclear to me the reason you think nde isn't worthy. Is it for this reason. Nde is not a valid psychological occurrence? Or. The often attributed supernatural explanation that causes it to be unworthy?
 
In the past I've mentioned Massimo's support of Ontic Structural Realism (only causality-transcendent mathematical relations are real) seems at odds with his rejection of immaterialist notions given that it isn't clear where consciousness fits into this Mathematical Platonism. (See Harris' claim that consciousness from that which is nonconscious makes as much sense as "2+2 = 7" as well as his new ideas on how to explore immaterial consciousness.)

Wanted to point out Bitbol's Is Consciousness Primary? asks this question as well in a more precist way than I've stated:

...another, diametrically opposite, strategy, to overcome the gap between absolutist and relational concpets seems to be available at this point. It relies on a variety of structural realism, according to which all there is (and not only what science can describe) reduces to structure. This view has been advocated as a respone of scientific realism against the challenge of paradigmatic changes and of the correlative instability of the set of entities that are accepted as existent at each stage of research. Several authors...pointed out that structures are good candidates for the role of transparadigmatic invariants...

...But if indeed all there is is structure, it would be pointless to invoke further intrinsic properties of matter unaccounted for by a purely structural phyiscs...It would be tempting to claim...that consciousness is pure structure...

But doesn't this mean ignoring the lessons of phenomenology...Isn't the deliberately non-phenomenological claim that consciousness itself is pure structure an ontological projection of methodological choice in favor of objective science as the only source of knowledge? It seems that many scientists are satisfied with statements like: "with our structural objective science, we can only account for the structural features of the contents of conscious experience, we then declare that there must be nothing more in conscious experience than structure". However , this kind of statement is utterly doubtful from a philosophical standpoint, since it springs from an almost implicit epistemological bias...

So, why does this matter? Well if - according to Massimo - the causality transcendent, nonreducible reality of Ontic Structural Realism is based on "the best physics available" and consciousness must be there at the outset with the Platonic Mathematical entities then we have the kind of souls describe by the Scholastics as noted by Feser's refutation of Churchland's poor accounting of dualism.

The Scholastic conception of soul as Form of a living being also (possibly) connects to the Theosophical/Spiritualist accounts of different bodies (fleshy, astral) but that's for another post as I gotta jet to the airport! (pun intended)

eta: Massimo's not a Platonist or Ontic Realist anymore, see here.
 
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