Consciousness an emergent of the brain?

I think there could be many irreducibles (pain, for instance, color for another) but I don't think that all irreducibles are ontological fundaments. I suspect only one ontological fundament: that which it is to be.
How can an irreducible not be an ontological fundamental?

~~ Paul
 
What does it mean for X to be irreducible yet dependent on Y?

~~ Paul

Pain for example can be irreducible, but dependent on the existence of consciousness. No need to also assume that pain is a foundation of existence. To wit, one could have consciousness without pain, but not pain without consciousness.
 
Pain for example can be irreducible, but dependent on the existence of consciousness. No need to also assume that pain is a foundation of existence. To wit, one could have consciousness without pain, but not pain without consciousness.
Hmm. I don't see how pain could be irreducible and not simply be "pure consciousness." As would anything else claimed to be irreducible but dependent on consciousness. In which case everything would feel the same, however pure consciousness feels. Seems to me pain must be consciousness plus something to distinguish it from all the other qualia.

Now, if you are going to claim that consciousness has many facets, one of which is pain, then I'd say pain = consciousness. But then clearly consciousness has attributes and so is not the attribute-free fundamental that you've been talking about.

~~ Paul
 
Hmm. I don't see how pain could be irreducible and not simply be "pure consciousness." As would anything else claimed to be irreducible but dependent on consciousness. In which case everything would feel the same, however pure consciousness feels. Seems to me pain must be consciousness plus something to distinguish it from all the other qualia.

Now, if you are going to claim that consciousness has many facets, one of which is pain, then I'd say pain = consciousness. But then clearly consciousness has attributes and so is not the attribute-free fundamental that you've been talking about.

~~ Paul

I think pain or any other specific perception / experience can be subtracted from "that which it is to be". Hence the former are non-fundamental but irreducible, whereas the latter is both irreducible and fundamental. I'm not seeing a problem.

I don't claim that consciousness has many facets, but I do think that a great many derivative states are possible. I am not seeing any need to add attributes to consciousness,unless one specifically means consciousness as pressed into specific experiential contexts. But again, specific experiential contexts, I do not take to be ontologically fundamental. Again, your plea sounds like a premise more plausible in a material ontology.
 
I think pain or any other specific perception / experience can be subtracted from "that which it is to be". Hence the former are non-fundamental but irreducible, whereas the latter is both irreducible and fundamental. I'm not seeing a problem.
What do you mean by subtracted? If the fundamental is irreducible, then I don't see how something can be subtracted from it.

I don't claim that consciousness has many facets, but I do think that a great many derivative states are possible. I am not seeing any need to add attributes to consciousness,unless one specifically means consciousness as pressed into specific experiential contexts. But again, specific experiential contexts, I do not take to be ontologically fundamental. Again, your plea sounds like a premise more plausible in a material ontology.
I really don't think I'm hung up on a material ontology, unless you believe that any sort of reducibility or built-up mechanism is material.

If there are derivative states that are a "subset" of the fundamental, then the fundamental is reducible. If there are derivative states that are a "superset" of the fundamental, then the derivatives (e.g., pain) are reducible. If all the qualia are wrapped up in a package with the fundamental yet can exhibit themselves independently, then surely the fundamental has attributes and there are laws that describe how the exhibiting works.

Perhaps I don't know what you mean by reducible. It's one of the slipperiest terms in philosophy.

~~ Paul
 
What do you mean by subtracted? If the fundamental is irreducible, then I don't see how something can be subtracted from it.

"Irreducible" and "fundamental" are not the same concept. Irreducible simply means cannot be broken down further and yet remain what it is. Fundamental, in the ontological sense, means cannot be broken down, removed, or "got behind" at all.

I really don't think I'm hung up on a material ontology, unless you believe that any sort of reducibility or built-up mechanism is material.

Well, I certainly think that it is the default assumption of a material ontology.

If there are derivative states that are a "subset" of the fundamental, then the fundamental is reducible.

Derivatives are not a "subset". They are an emergent phenomenon. Only their bare possibility could be considered actual within the fundamental of consciousness, but that probably takes us into metaphysical speculations you'd prefer to avoid. For my practical purposes here, they can be considered emergent but dependently tied to the fundamental of "that which it is to be."

If there are derivative states that are a "superset" of the fundamental, then the derivatives (e.g., pain) are reducible. If all the qualia are wrapped up in a package with the fundamental yet can exhibit themselves independently, then surely the fundamental has attributes and there are laws that describe how the exhibiting works.

I think you're tying yourself in knots unnecessarily. To be straightforward about it, I am not in pain right now, therefore self evidently pain is not a *necessary* fact of existence. Only a *necessary* fact of existence could be considered irreducible and fundamental. Likewise, I can close my eyes and see no colors or see no light at all. Thus again, color or light are not a *necessary* property of existence. One can do this, I maintain, for absolutely everything on such a notional list except one thing...that which it is to intuit one's own existence. That cannot be removed and yet it plausibly be maintained that we continue to talk about "consciousness" (and, as I would have it, "being"). Now the mystics maintain the existence of a subjectless consciousness. I have not experienced that, and so I remain agnostic on the possibility, but I see no immediate reason to doubt them. I do think the world (that is to say experiential states) are in some sense necessary for the formal completion or expression of consciousness, and from that completion come into existence many emergent phenomena, which are tied to the expression of consciousness in the world, but can also be subtracted again into a simple or unfolded form of consciousness which can be defined only in terms of "a sense of being."

Perhaps I don't know what you mean by reducible. It's one of the slipperiest terms in philosophy.

The seeing of red cannot be reduced to components. That's irreducible.
The fact of "that which it is to be" cannot be got behind or subtracted in ANY way...that is fundamental (and irreducible).
 
"Irreducible" and "fundamental" are not the same concept. Irreducible simply means cannot be broken down further and yet remain what it is. Fundamental, in the ontological sense, means cannot be broken down, removed, or "got behind" at all.
That's what you mean by irreducible? Well then, that might explain some of my confusion. What's an example of something that's reducible? Take a chair, for example. I can remove a few components and still have a chair. Eventually I have a minimal chair. Is that irreducible?

Here is the relevant Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article. Yikes!

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/

Perhaps you mean that the explanation of the thing cannot be given only in terms of the lower-level constituents of the thing.

I think you're tying yourself in knots unnecessarily. To be straightforward about it, I am not in pain right now, therefore self evidently pain is not a *necessary* fact of existence. Only a *necessary* fact of existence could be considered irreducible and fundamental. Likewise, I can close my eyes and see no colors or see no light at all. Thus again, color or light are not a *necessary* property of existence.
You seem to be saying that all fundamentals have to exist all the time in all places. I'm not sure why that should be so. But okay.

One can do this, I maintain, for absolutely everything on such a notional list except one thing...that which it is to intuit one's own existence. That cannot be removed and yet it plausibly be maintained that we continue to talk about "consciousness" (and, as I would have it, "being").
But it's removed whenever I'm not conscious. Perhaps you mean the potential to intuit one's own existence, but I'm not sure what that would mean.

Now the mystics maintain the existence of a subjectless consciousness. I have not experienced that, and so I remain agnostic on the possibility, but I see no immediate reason to doubt them. I do think the world (that is to say experiential states) are in some sense necessary for the formal completion or expression of consciousness, and from that completion come into existence many emergent phenomena, which are tied to the expression of consciousness in the world, but can also be subtracted again into a simple or unfolded form of consciousness which can be defined only in terms of "a sense of being."
I have had feelings of "pure consciousness" during meditation, where there are no objects of awareness. However, I'm not convinced that my own feeling of pure consciousness is not just another object of awareness.

The seeing of red cannot be reduced to components. That's irreducible.
It's reducible for people with various visual impairments. Or perhaps, as I suggested above, I don't know what you mean by "cannot be broken down further and yet remain what it is." I suppose we might try to identify the lowest-level components of qualia and call those irreducible, but how would we know if we were correct?

The fact of "that which it is to be" cannot be got behind or subtracted in ANY way...that is fundamental (and irreducible).
Do you mean "that which it feels like to be?

If you don't mean that, then "it is to be" sounds quite objective, so I don't see what it has to do with consciousness.

If you do mean "feels like to be," then I don't see why it's fundamental, since it disappears when I am not conscious.

~~ Paul
 
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it does remind me a good deal of Carl Jung's own empirical work with the psyche. He too identified structures and layers to the psyche, as did his precursor Frederic WH Myers in his scholarly many years long study published in "Human Personality" (I use the title he would have given his book, not the one given by his subsequent publishers posthumously). In a number of meetings Carl Jung had with Albert Einstein, in which they shared ideas and current discoveries of their different spheres of empirical research - Carl Jung did come away suspecting underlying both matter and the psyche was the same fundamental "thing" which was consciousness.

It is of course just a word we use to describe something far more profound, and varied. With many information structures and activities. However, attempting to understand this single underlying entity via the strict materialistic paradigm of local realism and causality is proving to be a very insufficient model. The scientific data being observed and recorded simply cannot be explained under the umbrella of traditional materialism or physicalism. That boat left the shore quite a long time ago IMO. And it isn't coming back.

My Best,
Bertha

There is a lot good to say about Structuralism, and as you say, Jung organized his worldview looking for structure. One of the very best examples is the work of J. Piaget and his structural view of mental development in the young. I will check-out Meyers.

I find the method of research transformations restricted to the laws of physics alone sound and productive. Just not a model of all of what we observe. I think the idea that all is material - is like a flat earth or an earth at the center of the universe.

I suggest that Informational Realism in tandem with a physicalist methodology - and in a matching and complementary relation - research restricted to the laws of logic, probability and information science fills in the picture, regarding HOW mind is working.
 
That's what you mean by irreducible? Well then, that might explain some of my confusion. What's an example of something that's reducible? Take a chair, for example. I can remove a few components and still have a chair. Eventually I have a minimal chair. Is that irreducible?

Yeah, a chair is pretty reducible. You could just keep reducing it or removing components until you were left only with a box or a ball that you were sitting on, etc. Of course part of the problem there is the ascriptive definition of what you call 'chair.'

Perhaps you mean that the explanation of the thing cannot be given only in terms of the lower-level constituents of the thing.

No. I mean that the thing or principle cannot be further reduced.

You seem to be saying that all fundamentals have to exist all the time in all places. I'm not sure why that should be so. But okay.

I think I have claimed that there is only one ontic fundamental, not many, and yes it would exist at "all times and places" else such things as "time" and "place"
would once more be more fundamental than the thing we were discussing, and I don't think they are. And this is also my answer to your next question.

But it's removed whenever I'm not conscious. Perhaps you mean the potential to intuit one's own existence, but I'm not sure what that would mean.

I'm not convinced there is ever a situation where consciousness does not apply. Rather, I think it's the subjective impression of something called "time" that doesn't apply. Hence near death experiences. As to sleep, you infer a state of "nonconsciousness" from symptoms which you apply a theorem to. in fact, your actual experience is that you were never not conscious. Ditto for anesthetics, coma, and other such claimed circumstances.

I have had feelings of "pure consciousness" during meditation, where there are no objects of awareness. However, I'm not convinced that my own feeling of pure consciousness is not just another object of awareness.

As I said, I can't verify or unverify the mystical claim here. But I don't have a problem with it (really). It may be that subjectless/objectless consciousness is possible, or it may be that "that which it is to be" is infinitely pluripotent, but must be completed, in practice, by any one of its infinite possibilities.

It's reducible for people with various visual impairments. Or perhaps, as I suggested above, I don't know what you mean by "cannot be broken down further and yet remain what it is." I suppose we might try to identify the lowest-level components of qualia and call those irreducible, but how would we know if we were correct?

No, it's not reducible. It's removable. That's not the same thing.

Do you mean "that which it feels like to be?

I don't think "that which it is to be" has subsets.
If you don't mean that, then "it is to be" sounds quite objective, so I don't see what it has to do with consciousness.

I already gave you my answer to that in a previous post.

If you do mean "feels like to be," then I don't see why it's fundamental, since it disappears when I am not conscious.

See above.
 
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No. I mean that the thing or principle cannot be further reduced.
I think this is not the usual definition of reducibility, especially if you include "and yet remain what it is" as you did above. But I certainly don't claim to be any expert. Seems to me, then, that a quale is reductible.

I'm not convinced there is ever a situation where consciousness does not apply. Rather, I think it's the subjective impression of something called "time" that doesn't apply. Hence near death experiences. As to sleep, you infer a state of "nonconsciousness" from symptoms which you apply a theorem to. in fact, your actual experience is that you were never not conscious. Ditto for anesthetics, coma, and other such claimed circumstances.
If I pass out and wake up at a later time, I can figure out and think about the fact that I was not conscious. How am I to explain this if we insist that I am always conscious?

No, it's not reducible. It's removable. That's not the same thing.
It's removable but not reducible only if you insist that every variation of a quale is a separate thing. So if I'm seeing red-1 and then suddenly something happens to my brain and the perception changes, I've removed red-1 and replaced it with red-2. Two things about this. First, our understanding of the visual system suggests that redness is created by many processes, some of which can be defective. Second, if irreducibility is obtained by saying that red-1 and red-2 are two separate things, then I think I can obtain irreducibility for anything: chair-1 is irreducible, because if I remove the back then I have chair-2, a separate thing.

I already gave you my answer to that in a previous post.
I think you simply asserted that being and consciousness are the same. But I'll take you at your word; no reason to argue this point further.

~~ Paul
 
I think this is not the usual definition of reducibility, especially if you include "and yet remain what it is" as you did above. But I certainly don't claim to be any expert. Seems to me, then, that a quale is reductible.

Okay, well then you seem to have substituted your own answer for your own question. If you are interested in my answer though, you already have it.

If I pass out and wake up at a later time, I can figure out and think about the fact that I was not conscious. How am I to explain this if we insist that I am always conscious?

That's what I mean. You "figure out and think abut it". In other words, you generate a construct of a "time period" when you were "unconscious." But that is not your lived-in experience. I can equally well say, and I think I do, that in terms of your lived-in experience, you were conscious continually, as I too have been throughout my life, despite rationalizations such as "wait a minute, a doctor operated on me there, "I" must have been unconscious..."


It's removable but not reducible only if you insist that every variation of a quale is a separate thing. So if I'm seeing red-1 and then suddenly something happens to my brain and the perception changes, I've removed red-1 and replaced it with red-2.

Again, I don't see substitution as being equatable with reducibility. My toothache can be substituted with a worse toothache,or with a worse pain altogether, such as acute appendicitis. Not seeing anything at all in that to persuade me that pain is reducible. But perhaps I am not understanding you.

Two things about this. First, our understanding of the visual system suggests that redness is created by many processes, some of which can be defective.

Redness cannot be "created" by an ascriptive "process" because it is yoked directly to "that which it is to be" meaning that its "description" is never going to be adequate or accurate from a 'third-person-perspective' ontology. I don't doubt that brain physics etc contributes massively to redness. However, here is the problem, there is actually no such thing anyway, as "third-person-brain physics." It's an abstraction that doesn't exist in nature (in my view of what the world is, anyway). A brain is a living, active theater of "that which it is to be in action". In any case, we are not talking about speculative processes that give rise to redness, assuming that they exist, but to the experience of redness itself. Not conflating the two goes a long way towards repairing discussions in which people misuse the term "reducible."

Second, if irreducibility is obtained by saying that red-1 and red-2 are two separate things, then I think I can obtain irreducibility for anything: chair-1 is irreducible, because if I remove the back then I have chair-2, a separate thing.

...and this is the problem with linguistic tricks rooted in ascriptive definitions of things. But whether I am in pain or not is not a linguistic trick, but a fact of primary experience. It is my primary experience that pain either is, or is not. Again, saying that "I can substitute pain-1 for pain-2" doesn't address this ontic primacy, imo, but is an argument trying to hide itself in verbal trickery. I don't have a problem with qualitiative ranges. Imo, toothache and appendicitis occupy a qualitative range, but "green-ness" is outside of that range, inside a different quality envelope altogether.

I think you simply asserted that being and consciousness are the same. But I'll take you at your word; no reason to argue this point further.

Rather, I think YOU just asserted that it wasn't, but weren't able to back up your case. I, on the other hand, reminded you that any third party ascriptions you imagine that you form for things are rooted first (and can only ever be rooted) in your prior fact of presence as a self-existing, self-realizing entity.
 
Okay, well then you seem to have substituted your own answer for your own question. If you are interested in my answer though, you already have it.
I don't understand the definition of irreducible: "cannot be broken down further and yet remain what it is." Nothing can be broken down and remain what it is.

That's what I mean. You "figure out and think abut it". In other words, you generate a construct of a "time period" when you were "unconscious." But that is not your lived-in experience. I can equally well say, and I think I do, that in terms of your lived-in experience, you were conscious continually, as I too have been throughout my life, despite rationalizations such as "wait a minute, a doctor operated on me there, "I" must have been unconscious..."
What you're saying here is that I'm only conscious when I'm conscious. That is certainly true.

Again, I don't see substitution as being equatable with reducibility. My toothache can be substituted with a worse toothache,or with a worse pain altogether, such as acute appendicitis. Not seeing anything at all in that to persuade me that pain is reducible. But perhaps I am not understanding you.
If any change to a quale is considered a replacement, then I agree that qualia sound irreducible. However, I don't think that the replacement idea is a good one. I think further research on consciousness will make it clear that qualia are built up out of subprocesses. They are not wholistic.

Redness cannot be "created" by an ascriptive "process" because it is yoked directly to "that which it is to be" meaning that its "description" is never going to be adequate or accurate from a 'third-person-perspective' ontology. I don't doubt that brain physics etc contributes massively to redness. However, here is the problem, there is actually no such thing anyway, as "third-person-brain physics." It's an abstraction that doesn't exist in nature (in my view of what the world is, anyway). A brain is a living, active theater of "that which it is to be in action". In any case, we are not talking about speculative processes that give rise to redness, assuming that they exist, but to the experience of redness itself. Not conflating the two goes a long way towards repairing discussions in which people misuse the term "reducible."
If we are talking about the experience itself, then I have no doubt it is reducible. People have experiences of "broken qualia" all the time. Consider migraines. The only way to insist that qualia are irreducible is to say that every possible quale is unrelated to all the others. To make the experience wholistic, you have to enumerate every possible experience as a separate irreducible thing. There can be no components that can vary.

...and this is the problem with linguistic tricks rooted in ascriptive definitions of things. But whether I am in pain or not is not a linguistic trick, but a fact of primary experience. It is my primary experience that pain either is, or is not. Again, saying that "I can substitute pain-1 for pain-2" doesn't address this ontic primacy, imo, but is an argument trying to hide itself in verbal trickery. I don't have a problem with qualitiative ranges. Imo, toothache and appendicitis occupy a qualitative range, but "green-ness" is outside of that range, inside a different quality envelope altogether.
There is no spectrum of green-ness? I don't think certain tetrachromats would agree with that. Oh, perhaps you mean that pain and green-ness have two different spectra. Yes, for sure.

Rather, I think YOU just asserted that it wasn't, but weren't able to back up your case. I, on the other hand, reminded you that any third party ascriptions you imagine that you form for things are rooted first (and can only ever be rooted) in your prior fact of presence as a self-existing, self-realizing entity.
And there is the assertion: that being/isness/presence is self-realizing (conscious). I certainly have no way to prove that you are wrong. I'm just not sure why the two should be the same.

~~ Paul
 
I don't understand the definition of irreducible: "cannot be broken down further and yet remain what it is." Nothing can be broken down and remain what it is.

Yes it can, if by "remain what it is" we mean maintain a similar essential nature by gradation. A version of a novel that is 120 pages and has one less character in the plot can have similar essential nature to the version that is 140 pages. However, a novel cannot become a toothache, no matter how many pages are added, or taken away.

What you're saying here is that I'm only conscious when I'm conscious. That is certainly true.

No. What I am implying is consciousness is present always, and that you only *infer* the idea that it is not from ultimately questionable rationalizations not rooted in primary experience.

If any change to a quale is considered a replacement, then I agree that qualia sound irreducible. However, I don't think that the replacement idea is a good one. I think further research on consciousness will make it clear that qualia are built up out of subprocesses. They are not wholistic.

I'm not interested in (or persuaded by) open ended promissory notes. Either show me now how these quales are "built up" or I shall continue to consider the notion false at its root.


If we are talking about the experience itself, then I have no doubt it is reducible. People have experiences of "broken qualia" all the time. Consider migraines. The only way to insist that qualia are irreducible is to say that every possible quale is unrelated to all the others. To make the experience wholistic, you have to enumerate every possible experience as a separate irreducible thing. There can be no components that can vary.

No,I don't think so. As I said, I think there are such things as qualitiative envelopes that don't commute. I don't understand what point you are trying to make with migraines. Perhaps you could make that more clear?


There is no spectrum of green-ness? I don't think certain tetrachromats would agree with that. Oh, perhaps you mean that pain and green-ness have two different spectra. Yes, for sure.

Yes, I think there's an envelope for green-ness, an envelope for pain, etc (as I said above). And yes, I also said already that I don't think that pain can commute into green.

And there is the assertion: that being/isness/presence is self-realizing (conscious). I certainly have no way to prove that you are wrong. I'm just not sure why the two should be the same.

If you mean, can I absolutely definitively prove that there is no third-party "being" then no, I can't (not least because this isn't a doable action). But I can suspect that we form the very idea out of a misplaced projection of our own first-person-ontolgy, thus making the notion very deeply suspect.
 
I don't understand the definition of irreducible: "cannot be broken down further and yet remain what it is." Nothing can be broken down and remain what it is.

~~ Paul
A mathematical object surely can be factored, but still remain the same. A quantity is still a quantity. Even if it is a prime and irreducible. It's where the term irreducible comes from. Broken-down doesn't have to refer to a solid. You can break down the logical instructions in a program's code to sub-routines. Will the complete program not run - if you have reduced the program to its individual instructions, but still run them in the original sequence?
 
Yes it can, if by "remain what it is" we mean maintain a similar essential nature by gradation. A version of a novel that is 120 pages and has one less character in the plot can have similar essential nature to the version that is 140 pages. However, a novel cannot become a toothache, no matter how many pages are added, or taken away.
Ah, okay, then qualia could be irreducible.

No. What I am implying is consciousness is present always, and that you only *infer* the idea that it is not from ultimately questionable rationalizations not rooted in primary experience.
I don't think it's "ultimately questionable" to assume there is no consciousness when I am unconscious.

I'm not interested in (or persuaded by) open ended promissory notes. Either show me now how these quales are "built up" or I shall continue to consider the notion false at its root.
I think if you read the literature on qualia you will be convinced that they are built up. However, if irreducible things can differ by gradation, then qualia may very well be called irreducible.

Yes, I think there's an envelope for green-ness, an envelope for pain, etc (as I said above). And yes, I also said already that I don't think that pain can commute into green.
I don't think so, either.

If you mean, can I absolutely definitively prove that there is no third-party "being" then no, I can't (not least because this isn't a doable action). But I can suspect that we form the very idea out of a misplaced projection of our own first-person-ontolgy, thus making the notion very deeply suspect.
Fair enough.

~~ Paul
 
A mathematical object surely can be factored, but still remain the same.
But when Kai talks of factoring, he appears to be talking about removing the factors. He disagreed with me when I said:

Perhaps you mean that the explanation of the thing cannot be given only in terms of the lower-level constituents of the thing.

A quantity is still a quantity. Even if it is a prime and irreducible. It's where the term irreducible comes from. Broken-down doesn't have to refer to a solid. You can break down the logical instructions in a program's code to sub-routines. Will the complete program not run - if you have reduced the program to its individual instructions, but still run them in the original sequence?
You do seem to be using the term irreducible as in my bolded sentence above. That is my understanding of the "standard" use of the term, but I think Kai has a different meaning.

Irreducibility and emergence: The mega-squirrels of philosophy.

~~ Paul
 
Ah, okay, then qualia could be irreducible.

Well, I already said things like green and pain are irreducible.

I don't think it's "ultimately questionable" to assume there is no consciousness when I am unconscious.

I think it *is* questionable whether we are ever unconscious, especially when one analyzes how that conclusion was arrived at.

I think if you read the literature on qualia you will be convinced that they are built up. However, if irreducible things can differ by gradation, then qualia may very well be called irreducible.

Oh I don't think I'd be convinced at all. In fact, I predict that the conversation would end up in precisely the same disagreement. When I say that "x is irreducible" what I mean is that nothing further can be removed without it being transformed into something else altogether.
 
I think it *is* questionable whether we are ever unconscious, especially when one analyzes how that conclusion was arrived at.
I arrive at it by asking someone who is conscious to test whether I am conscious while on the operating table. It is clear that time passes while I am not conscious. It would require some quite baroque explanation to cover how I could have been conscious the entire time. Perhaps we should treat each individual separately, but that smacks of solipsism.

Oh I don't think I'd be convinced at all. In fact, I predict that the conversation would end up in precisely the same disagreement. When I say that "x is irreducible" what I mean is that nothing further can be removed without it being transformed into something else altogether.
I know what you mean, but I don't think it's true of qualia. I think you can remove aspects of a quale and still have a quale. Now, there can certainly be "the simplest qualia" from which nothing can be removed without making them non-qualia, but that means that some of the things we call qualia are reducible.

Also, as I've said, I think you are using a definition of irreducible that is not standard. But, as I've also said, it's a quagmire.

~~ Paul
 
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