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Sciborg_S_Patel
The Argument against Physicalism - an excerpt from A Place for Consciousness, the book that turned one of Dennet's students from a materialist into a dualist.
Physicalism says that the fundamental physical facts are the only fundamental facts. All other facts, whether about rocks, tables, morals, or minds, are derivative on these physical facts. In this chapter, I argue that physicalism is false by arguing that a purely physical world could not contain facts of experience. Others have given arguments of this kind, but I hope to look at this kind of argument in a fresh way. In chapter 3 I defend the argument against objections.
My argument is not a form of conceivability argument or knowledge argument. It is a direct argument that the phenomenal facts are of a type that cannot be entailed, either a priori or a posteriori,i by the physical facts. To diagnose precisely why entailment fails, I produce a working analysis of physical facts as a type. This working analysis is central to this chapter, and it recurs in part II. Because the specific lessons of this chapter s argument hold recurring importance, I ask even readers who are familiar (or impatient) with the debate over physicalism to pay some attention to this chapter.