Laird
Member
I see what you're saying, Neil, and you've shared some interesting thoughts. I'll share some thoughts of my own along a slightly different tack, because I'm not so sure that the is-ought problem cannot be overcome with logic - of a sort - anyway: by wrapping its solution up in a single premise. I've been reluctant to formalise the premises which I think lead to the conclusion of the fundamental objective moral principle(s), but it would be possible to do so, and, in doing so, we might be able to "evade" the is-ought problem as a "logical" problem simply through the use of a premise like this:
"If [the supporting premises] hold, then we ought to abide by [the fundamental moral principle]".
(Followed of course by the supporting premises, and the conclusion - that we ought to abide by the fundamental moral principle - by modus ponens).
We would then support this "wrapped-up solution-premise" to the is-ought problem via the sort of intuitive reasoning-framing which we've each independently shared already in this thread.
So, when I wrote earlier that we have "not yet developed a logic" for converting an is to an ought, this need not be a fatal "logical" problem.
And that it is possible to convert an is to an ought in this way is, I think, necessitated by two facts: (1) that, clearly, we humans do believe in the bindingness of morality, and thus that "oughts" have a fundamental reality to them (they are not mere statements of opinion), and, (2) that there does not appear any other realistic way of getting to these fundamentally real "oughts" other than through "is"es.
With respect to #2, there are various other possibilities that might be suggested, the prime candidate in our Western culture being divine command theory, but clearly this is inadequate as a solution. If morality is determined by mere decree (even if divine), then it is arbitrary, yet we know on a deep level that it is not. I think we could dispense with all of the other candidates in a similar way, and thus be left with a second reason to accept the "naturalistic" bridging of the is-ought fallacy: that some bridge is necessary, and this is the only plausible candidate.
With respect to Sam's central thesis: that science can determine the more specific moral rules based on the fundamental one that well-being ought to be promoted and harm minimised, I would be very cautious in accepting it outright. I think that Grorganic's contributions to this thread have been very useful in this respect, in the sense that he might be seen to have suggested that different cultures have different notions of what "well-being" constitutes (specifically) in the first place. If Sam is willing to incorporate the values and will of different cultures into the scientific equation, then this problem might be soluble, however I think Grorganic's point that much harm can be done by imposing foreign, supposedly objective, moral rules onto a culture is a solid one, and should give us caution about the universal-isability of every moral rule. Some of them might very much be culture-dependent. For the sake of brevity I won't illustrate my point with examples. I am not sure whether Sam addresses this anywhere in his book (because I still have not read it) but I would be surprised if he does. He is at times somewhat imperialist in his thinking.
Finally: would anybody object to a separation out of this "Veganism" thread of these latter posts which concern this discussion of moral grounding? It would in my eyes be nice to keep the veganism thread about veganism proper, and split out into a separate thread this more general moral discussion which really doesn't have much to do with veganism itself. @David Bailey might be kind enough to do it for us, otherwise @Alex might be kind enough to (again) give me temporary admin privs to do it myself.
"If [the supporting premises] hold, then we ought to abide by [the fundamental moral principle]".
(Followed of course by the supporting premises, and the conclusion - that we ought to abide by the fundamental moral principle - by modus ponens).
We would then support this "wrapped-up solution-premise" to the is-ought problem via the sort of intuitive reasoning-framing which we've each independently shared already in this thread.
So, when I wrote earlier that we have "not yet developed a logic" for converting an is to an ought, this need not be a fatal "logical" problem.
And that it is possible to convert an is to an ought in this way is, I think, necessitated by two facts: (1) that, clearly, we humans do believe in the bindingness of morality, and thus that "oughts" have a fundamental reality to them (they are not mere statements of opinion), and, (2) that there does not appear any other realistic way of getting to these fundamentally real "oughts" other than through "is"es.
With respect to #2, there are various other possibilities that might be suggested, the prime candidate in our Western culture being divine command theory, but clearly this is inadequate as a solution. If morality is determined by mere decree (even if divine), then it is arbitrary, yet we know on a deep level that it is not. I think we could dispense with all of the other candidates in a similar way, and thus be left with a second reason to accept the "naturalistic" bridging of the is-ought fallacy: that some bridge is necessary, and this is the only plausible candidate.
With respect to Sam's central thesis: that science can determine the more specific moral rules based on the fundamental one that well-being ought to be promoted and harm minimised, I would be very cautious in accepting it outright. I think that Grorganic's contributions to this thread have been very useful in this respect, in the sense that he might be seen to have suggested that different cultures have different notions of what "well-being" constitutes (specifically) in the first place. If Sam is willing to incorporate the values and will of different cultures into the scientific equation, then this problem might be soluble, however I think Grorganic's point that much harm can be done by imposing foreign, supposedly objective, moral rules onto a culture is a solid one, and should give us caution about the universal-isability of every moral rule. Some of them might very much be culture-dependent. For the sake of brevity I won't illustrate my point with examples. I am not sure whether Sam addresses this anywhere in his book (because I still have not read it) but I would be surprised if he does. He is at times somewhat imperialist in his thinking.
Finally: would anybody object to a separation out of this "Veganism" thread of these latter posts which concern this discussion of moral grounding? It would in my eyes be nice to keep the veganism thread about veganism proper, and split out into a separate thread this more general moral discussion which really doesn't have much to do with veganism itself. @David Bailey might be kind enough to do it for us, otherwise @Alex might be kind enough to (again) give me temporary admin privs to do it myself.