Still Stuck on Stupid

If you were to say that the vast majority of people in the atheist/secular/materialist/skeptical world don't believe in the afterlife, UFOs, ghosts or psi, then that would be a reasonable statement. What I object to is the idea that the vast majority of these people also agree about the nature of consciousness, free-will and moral values. These are philosophical questions, and let's face it, many people in the skeptical world think that philosophy is a waste of time and really don't know much about the subject. My suggestion is that if these people actually bothered to read some philosophy, and if they spent some time talking with Nagel, McGinn and Chalmers about these issues, then many of the them would agree with them about consciousness. There's still a lot of anti-philosophy feeling among skeptics, and a lot of ignorance.

You may be right, but if so, the fault is with the skeptics that don't read and understand what philosophers like Chalmers are saying!

And by the way, every time someone says that materialists think that consciousness is an illusion, I know that they are being uncharitable and caricaturing people. How do I know this? Because no intelligent person would every say that consciousness is an illusion.
Daniel Dennett gave a talk on this very subject:

http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_dennett_on_our_consciousness

More generally, I think skeptics tend to avoid agreeing about the special nature of qualia, or indeed about the value of philosophy in general, because they want to get rid of a very sharp and clear observation - that explaining qualia is a key issue with materialism - by fudging and blurring over the issue, or simply ignoring it. This is something that they do repeatedly, coming up with theories of consciousness that don't even address the issue:

http://cogweb.ucla.edu/CogSci/GWorkspace.html

David
 
More generally, I think skeptics tend to avoid agreeing about the special nature of qualia, or indeed about the value of philosophy in general, because they want to get rid of a very sharp and clear observation - that explaining qualia is a key issue with materialism - by fudging and blurring over the issue, or simply ignoring it.
Yes. Either qualia is a phenomenon, in which case there's a demonstrable trail back to its source, or it isn't a phenomenon, which leaves the method of arriving at any conclusion unaccounted for. Materialists invented the idea of an epiphenomenon to fudge the gap, an imaginary state of awareness, a by-product of electro-chemical processes without the slightest proof to back it up, except promissory bouncing cheques at an intellectual Ponzi scheme. To her credit Churchland reasoned that consciousness was a phenomenon, but when pressed could show no evidence why she thought it so.
 
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Take a look at this passage from Colin McGinn in his recent New Statesman article, where he describes the eiliminativist position:

The eliminativist position attempts to dissolve the problem of explaining consciousness simply by declaring that there isn't any: there is no such thing - no seeing, hearing, thinking, and so on. There is just blank matter; the impression that we are conscious is an illusion. This view is clearly absurd, a form of madness even, and anyway refutes itself since even an illusion is the presence of an experience (it certainly seems to me that I am conscious). There are some who purport to hold this view but they are a tiny (and tinny) minority: they are sentient beings loudly claiming to be mindless zombies.

Yet many on this forum seem to think that most materialists or atheists are eliminativists!

Personally I think that even Dennett and Churchland are not really eliminativists. But even if they are, so what? This just means that a couple of philosophers have strange and silly metaphysical views.
 
David, just because there's a speech by Dennett with the words 'consciousness' and 'illusion' in the title, that doesn't mean that Dennett actually believes or argues that consciousness is an illusion.

What I think he's trying to do is to show that our common-sense ideas about consciousness, the self and free-will are wrong or simplistic. This is not the same as saying that our conscious experience is an illusion, which would be an absurd thing to say.
 
For various reasons, but mainly that Churchland publicly identifies with a set of unsupportable propositions as a paid academic and writer. I mean, people can believe any old thing they like, but if they lecture and publish from a given position, they'll inevitably attract dissent unless their observations are watertight, which Churchland's most certainly are not.
The same goes for ideas of free will. I believe free will is viable, within the limits of the human condition. People may be genetically predisposed and emotionally conditioned to a series of responses, but that doesn't mean their actions are predetermined. I reach that assumption from a position of consciousness, and on subjects which are born of consciousness, there's no higher standard. There simply is no objective, non-conscious way of determining that I lack free will. I feel I have free will, therefore I do. Arguing I or anyone else does not cannot be proven, and is not within the purview of science, and philosophical conclusions are entirely conditional. Those who think they are beyond mere opinion and in the realm of objectivity, need to prove so. This they have signally failed to do.

The statement 'Consciousness is an illusion' or 'Consciousness doesn't exist' is absurd. If it SEEMS like you're conscious then you ARE conscious.

But the statement 'Free-will is an illusion' or 'Free-will doesn't exist' is not absurd in the same way. There are many philosophical and theological reasons for thinking that free-will and moral responsibility are impossible.

So you now object to Churchland's views on purely intellectual grounds, and you just want to protect the integrity of academia and the university system? OK, fair enough. At least you're not saying that materialism is poisoning our children's minds and filling the world with violence and selfishness.
 
So you now object to Churchland's views on purely intellectual grounds, and you just want to protect the integrity of academia and the university system? OK, fair enough. At least you're not saying that materialism is poisoning our children's minds and filling the world with violence and selfishness.
Not at all, I'm saying Churchland is appealing on intellectual grounds. As for philosophical and religious reasons for doubting free will, line them up and I'll use intellectual or instinctive ways to shoot them down.
 
Not at all, I'm saying Churchland is appealing on intellectual grounds. As for philosophical and religious reasons for doubting free will, line them up and I'll use intellectual or instinctive ways to shoot them down.

The main philosophical arguments are nicely summarized by Galen Strawson here:

http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/Mysteries-of-Free-Will-Galen-Strawson-/1727

But the point is not that Galen Strawson is definitely right to say that free-will and moral responsibility are impossible because they're conceptually incoherent, though many philosophers today do agree with him on this point. The point is just that doubting free-will and moral responsiblity is not irrational or illogical in the way that doubting conscious experience is. Free-will can be rationally doubted, but conscious experience cannot.

Some religious people would argue that human free-will is incompatible with the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God, but I don't believe in such a God anyway, so these arguments are not of much interest to me.
 
Searle, himself a materialist, has offered potential counter arguments to Strawson's points here.

The Information Philosopher website has some materialist accounts and counterpoints as well.

But as Chomsky points out no one really acts like there is no free will, though Harris claims that he does try not to hate anyone as no one is ultimately responsible for their actions. Coyne's denial of free will hasn't stopped him from going on tirade after tirade.

Kaku also discusses the free will issue at the end of his latest book, providing a good practical argument. Realize that total individualism free from all conditioning is likely a fantasy, but also don't completely deny the visceral feeling of choice.
 
Searle, himself a materialist, has offered potential counter arguments to Strawson's points here.

The Information Philosopher website has some materialist accounts and counterpoints as well.

But as Chomsky points out no one really acts like there is no free will, though Harris claims that he does try not to hate anyone as no one is ultimately responsible for their actions. Coyne's denial of free will hasn't stopped him from going on tirade after tirade.

Kaku also discusses the free will issue at the end of his latest book, providing a good practical argument. Realize that total individualism free from all conditioning is likely a fantasy, but also don't completely deny the visceral feeling of choice.

Sciborg, this is a great post. What you've said is fair and reasonable, and is in stark contrast to what we hear from Alex on Skeptiko. Skeptiko is still stuck on stupid when Alex says that we believe in consciousness and free-will, whereas those materialists on the other side believe that conscious experience and free-will are illusory. I appreciate that he's trying to make the debate understandable to non-philosophers by lumping free-will and consciousness together and by generalizing about atheists and materiaists, but it's really not helping matters at all.

I live in China, so unfortunately I can't watch that youtube video here. Maybe you could summarize Searle's views about Strawson's argument.
 
Something Gabriel wrote got me thinking about the fact that on this forum there are two very popular, but actually inconsistent, views on materialism. The first is that, no matter what they say in philosophy or science class, deep down all atheists and materialists believe, and will go on believing, in free-will, objective values and conscious experience. The second is that materialist ideas are extremely dangerous and will increase the amount of violence, greed and selfishness in the world.

So which is it? You can't have it both ways.
 
Something Gabriel wrote got me thinking about the fact that on this forum there are two very popular, but actually inconsistent, views on materialism. The first is that, no matter what they say in philosophy or science class, deep down all atheists and materialists believe, and will go on believing, in free-will, objective values and conscious experience. The second is that materialist ideas are extremely dangerous and will increase the amount of violence, greed and selfishness in the world.

So which is it? You can't have it both ways.
Your point is not very clear, can you explain further? I do believe materialism is a dangerous doctrine because its morality is relative, and human beings are not recognised as extraordinary. My consciousness is 'extraordinary', at least to me, and I don't want anyone reducing the complexity of my human condition to the mundane, or servicing it with philosophical conveniences which may limit it.

As for free will I can only repeat myself. Materialists share the Calvinist belief in its absence. I accept conditioning and predisposition, but free will gives humans the opportunity to make choices, particularly moral choices, that operate outside personal well being and survival. I don't know what else you call that phenomenon except free will.
 
Your point is not very clear, can you explain further? I do believe materialism is a dangerous doctrine because its morality is relative, and human beings are not recognised as extraordinary. My consciousness is 'extraordinary', at least to me, and I don't want anyone reducing the complexity of my human condition to the mundane

I find this sentence 'extraordinary'. Who has done that? If materialism has any truth it is unlikely to be mundane.

or servicing it with philosophical conveniences which may limit it.

Hmm... You appear to be setting the limits here, but you may need to explain this further.

As for free will I can only repeat myself. Materialists share the Calvinist belief in its absence. I accept conditioning and predisposition, but free will gives humans the opportunity to make choices, particularly moral choices, that operate outside personal well being and survival. I don't know what else you call that phenomenon except free will.

Where do you think the 'freeness' of your will is coming from?
 
Your point is not very clear, can you explain further? I do believe materialism is a dangerous doctrine because its morality is relative, and human beings are not recognised as extraordinary. My consciousness is 'extraordinary', at least to me, and I don't want anyone reducing the complexity of my human condition to the mundane, or servicing it with philosophical conveniences which may limit it.

There's a contradiction here if that you think BOTH that human beings will always go on believing in consciousness, free-will and objective values no matter what AND that materialist ideas have the power to poison people's minds and make people more violent and selfish. Do materialist philosophers have the power to make people stop believing in these things or not? I say no.
 
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Materialists for the most part see themselves as realists. They imagine themselves capable of making tough choices, staring uncompromisingly into the void, or determining when a foetus is capable of feeling pain. I don't want pragmatism from my ruling paradigm, I desire kindness and understanding, two very different imperatives. I don't think believing in consciousness is necessary, it's the only thing that is utterly self evident. It comes before any kind of objectivity and proof. So belief is an inappropriate term to associate with the phenomenon of consciousness, it just 'is'.

Given its absolute precedence, and no viable materialistic theory to account for it, I fail to see any authority over it in determining its boundaries. As there are no limits, how can we use terms like free or not free? Without any borders except predisposition, or character tendencies, what determines this absence and how? If I feel free, prove to me that I am not in a way that avoids my consciousness.
 
Here are the two contradictory propositions:

1. No matter what people may say in philosophy or science class, human beings will always go on believing in consciousness, free-will and objective values.
2. Materialist ideas are dangerous because they can make people stop believing in consciousness, free-will and objective values, and this will lead to a great deal of violence, greed, immorality and selfishness.
 
For those who may be interested:

"The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating"
http://www.carlsonschool.umn.edu/assets/91974.pdf

"Prosocial Benefits of Feeling Free: Disbelief in Free Will Increases Aggression and Reduces Helpfulness"
https://users.wfu.edu/~masicaej/Baumeisteretal2009PSPB.pdf

"Inducing Disbelief in Free Will Alters Brain Correlates of Preconscious Motor Preparation: The Brain Minds Whether We Believe in Free Will or Not"
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.short

 
Take a look at this passage from Colin McGinn in his recent New Statesman article, where he describes the eiliminativist position:

The eliminativist position attempts to dissolve the problem of explaining consciousness simply by declaring that there isn't any: there is no such thing - no seeing, hearing, thinking, and so on. There is just blank matter; the impression that we are conscious is an illusion. This view is clearly absurd, a form of madness even, and anyway refutes itself since even an illusion is the presence of an experience (it certainly seems to me that I am conscious). There are some who purport to hold this view but they are a tiny (and tinny) minority: they are sentient beings loudly claiming to be mindless zombies.

I think McGinn is oversimplifying. Read the first two sentences carefully:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism

And the first sentence here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/

What is being eliminated is folk psychological models of the mind. Now, of course, there may be some harder-core eliminativists who eliminate even more.

Personally I think that even Dennett and Churchland are not really eliminativists. But even if they are, so what? This just means that a couple of philosophers have strange and silly metaphysical views.
Or they are eliminativists, but of the sort defined above.

~~ Paul
 
For those who may be interested:

"The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating"
http://www.carlsonschool.umn.edu/assets/91974.pdf

"Prosocial Benefits of Feeling Free: Disbelief in Free Will Increases Aggression and Reduces Helpfulness"
https://users.wfu.edu/~masicaej/Baumeisteretal2009PSPB.pdf

"Inducing Disbelief in Free Will Alters Brain Correlates of Preconscious Motor Preparation: The Brain Minds Whether We Believe in Free Will or Not"
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.short
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.short
Raising the same sort of question as with placebos: Should we lie to people in order to sustain or produce effects that we think are useful?


I vote no. Your mileage may vary.

~~ Paul
 
What is being eliminated is folk psychological models of the mind.
What can be more folksie than the brain exclusively gives rise to mind? There is no evidence for it, yet people want to believe it. In that context the limit of the mind is the few inches of organic tissue inside the cranium.
 
Here are the two contradictory propositions:

1. No matter what people may say in philosophy or science class, human beings will always go on believing in consciousness, free-will and objective values.
2. Materialist ideas are dangerous because they can make people stop believing in consciousness, free-will and objective values, and this will lead to a great deal of violence, greed, immorality and selfishness.

1. I don't agree with the proposition. Human beings have a tendency to ignore philosophies they claim to agree with, and revert to habit, but that isn't inevitable. Some live at the top of pillars for forty years, while others absolutely act as though they are the automata they believe themselves to be. Concentration camp guards adopted the role of biological machines, as did the official functionaries of various hideous and inhuman regimes. One definition of evil might be the complete silencing of the voice of conscience, the quelling of what it means to be completely human.

2. Materialist ideas can be dangerous and often are. They appeal to authority and the intellect, reduce emotion and instinct to secondary importance, elevate science to religious status, and promote score and ridicule of others. That doesn't mean every materialist is wicked, though I believe all are misguided.
 
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