Arouet
Member
This thread stems from Sciborg's posts in several threads referencing Raymond Tallis' article What Neuroscience Cannot Tell us about Ourselves.
I'm going to go through the article, which I had not read prior to Sciborg posting it, laying out what I agree with and what I don't. I'll point out areas where I think Tallis' logic doesn't quite hold. I'll also raise the use of some rhetorical devices that I think serve to manipulate the reader to compel them to accept his arguments emotionally rather than logically.
These are my thoughts based on reading through the article twice. I am not presenting them as authoritative but with the hope that it will lead to discussion and constructive critique. I think it will be interesting to go through an article in depth.
Anyone should feel welcome to participate - not just me and Sci!
Intro:
In this article, Tallis seems to vary between arguing that neuroscience has not fully accounted for how behaviour and awareness work (a fairly sound claim, imo) and arguing that neuroscience will never be able to do so (a much more dubious claim.) I'll state off the bat that I'm rarely comfortable with "never-ever" type arguments. They are rarely well-founded (unless talking about logical impossibilities) and serve little productive purpose, imo. This article seems to me to be a good example of why.
Tallis starts by stating "What neuroscience does not do, however, is provide a satisfactory account of the conditions that are sufficient for behavior and awareness." I think this is a fair comment - I think most neuroscientists would agree that they've a ways to go in figuring out how the brain produces awareness.
He continues: "The pervasive yet mistaken idea that neuroscience does fully account for awareness and behavior is neuroscientism, an exercise in science-based faith. " This kind of comment isn't helpful. First, he doesn't provide any examples. I'm not sure neuroscientists do tend to make the claim that neuroscience has fully accounted for awareness out or that people have argued that it has. It doesn't reflect subtleties in people's positions.
But more important than that, what it does, I think, is take a legitimate point and turn it into a manipulative, rhetorical device. The legitimate point is the neuroscience hasn't quite figured out how the brain produces awareness and that we should be open to the idea that there is something beyond the brain involved. But when he labels it neuroscientism and science-based faith he triggers an emotional reaction in the reader. This can triggers defence mechanisms that can harden a reader against his arguments, or attempt to sway them in favour of his position by not wanting to be associated with "faith-based belief". Both distract from what the reader should be paying attention to: his arguments.
He next correctly states, imo, that "While to live a human life requires having a brain in some kind of working order, it does not follow from this fact that to live a human life is to be a brain in some kind of working order." I agree that the former does not imply the latter.
He describes what he sees as the importance of the issue:
"The failure to distinguish consciousness from neural activity corrodes our self-understanding in two significant ways. If we are just our brains, and our brains are just evolved organs designed to optimize our odds of survival — or, more precisely, to maximize the replicative potential of the genetic material for which we are the vehicle — then we are merely beasts like any other, equally beholden as apes and centipedes to biological drives. Similarly, if we are just our brains, and our brains are just material objects, then we, and our lives, are merely way stations in the great causal net that is the universe, stretching from the Big Bang to the Big Crunch."
This seems to be a mixture of fuzzy logic, vague premises and category errors. There are many ways to catergorise people. Whether we are "just" or "merely" anything depends on the choices. His argument is this:
P1: We are just our brains.
P2: Our brains our just organs designed to maximize the replicative potential of genetic material
P3: Other animals are just their brains.
P4: Other animals' brains are just organs designed to maximize the replicative potential of genetic material
C1: We are merely beasts.
C2: We are equally beholden as apes and centipedes to biological drives
We see this way how vague the premises are.
Tallis gets into the trouble here that many get into (even "materialists") when they refer to humans "just" being material. That is vague, and of limited descriptive value without added information. It is also misleading. "just" is being used, presumably, in a connotation to indicate "to the exclusion of anything else." But this depends on the categories we're looking at. If the categories are material/non-material then it might be accurate to say that we are just material - but that doesn't tell us much. When he posits the premise that our brains are "just" evolved organs designed to optimitze our odds of survival (putting aside the design issue) he is just (no-pun intended) looking at a single proposed characteristic of the brain. When he refers to us being "merely" beasts he's limiting it to one category "being equally beholden to biological drives."
Framing the premises in terms of "just" and "merely" are inaccurate without clarifying the caterogies and achieve little other than ascribing a negative connotation - it again triggers an emotional reaction, suggesting that this is somewhat undesirable. Whether that is the case or not, focusing on that increases our prejudices against that result, detracting from argument.
See how the argument changes character if we tighten it up:
P1: Our sense of self and awareness derive from our brains in conjunction with the rest of our bodies, interacting with the environment.
P2: Our brains are organs which evolved at least in part because they provided a selected advantage to human species.
P3: Other animals also have brains, with varying levels of senses and awareness.
P4: Other animals' brains also evolved at least in part because they provided a selected advantage to their respective species.
C1: Human and other animals have brains that derive senses and awareness in varying degrees.
C2: Human and other animals' senses and awareness vary due to their biology.
Ok, I'll stop here for now. Will continue with the introduction in another post, but this can get the discussion started.
I'm going to go through the article, which I had not read prior to Sciborg posting it, laying out what I agree with and what I don't. I'll point out areas where I think Tallis' logic doesn't quite hold. I'll also raise the use of some rhetorical devices that I think serve to manipulate the reader to compel them to accept his arguments emotionally rather than logically.
These are my thoughts based on reading through the article twice. I am not presenting them as authoritative but with the hope that it will lead to discussion and constructive critique. I think it will be interesting to go through an article in depth.
Anyone should feel welcome to participate - not just me and Sci!
Intro:
In this article, Tallis seems to vary between arguing that neuroscience has not fully accounted for how behaviour and awareness work (a fairly sound claim, imo) and arguing that neuroscience will never be able to do so (a much more dubious claim.) I'll state off the bat that I'm rarely comfortable with "never-ever" type arguments. They are rarely well-founded (unless talking about logical impossibilities) and serve little productive purpose, imo. This article seems to me to be a good example of why.
Tallis starts by stating "What neuroscience does not do, however, is provide a satisfactory account of the conditions that are sufficient for behavior and awareness." I think this is a fair comment - I think most neuroscientists would agree that they've a ways to go in figuring out how the brain produces awareness.
He continues: "The pervasive yet mistaken idea that neuroscience does fully account for awareness and behavior is neuroscientism, an exercise in science-based faith. " This kind of comment isn't helpful. First, he doesn't provide any examples. I'm not sure neuroscientists do tend to make the claim that neuroscience has fully accounted for awareness out or that people have argued that it has. It doesn't reflect subtleties in people's positions.
But more important than that, what it does, I think, is take a legitimate point and turn it into a manipulative, rhetorical device. The legitimate point is the neuroscience hasn't quite figured out how the brain produces awareness and that we should be open to the idea that there is something beyond the brain involved. But when he labels it neuroscientism and science-based faith he triggers an emotional reaction in the reader. This can triggers defence mechanisms that can harden a reader against his arguments, or attempt to sway them in favour of his position by not wanting to be associated with "faith-based belief". Both distract from what the reader should be paying attention to: his arguments.
He next correctly states, imo, that "While to live a human life requires having a brain in some kind of working order, it does not follow from this fact that to live a human life is to be a brain in some kind of working order." I agree that the former does not imply the latter.
He describes what he sees as the importance of the issue:
"The failure to distinguish consciousness from neural activity corrodes our self-understanding in two significant ways. If we are just our brains, and our brains are just evolved organs designed to optimize our odds of survival — or, more precisely, to maximize the replicative potential of the genetic material for which we are the vehicle — then we are merely beasts like any other, equally beholden as apes and centipedes to biological drives. Similarly, if we are just our brains, and our brains are just material objects, then we, and our lives, are merely way stations in the great causal net that is the universe, stretching from the Big Bang to the Big Crunch."
This seems to be a mixture of fuzzy logic, vague premises and category errors. There are many ways to catergorise people. Whether we are "just" or "merely" anything depends on the choices. His argument is this:
P1: We are just our brains.
P2: Our brains our just organs designed to maximize the replicative potential of genetic material
P3: Other animals are just their brains.
P4: Other animals' brains are just organs designed to maximize the replicative potential of genetic material
C1: We are merely beasts.
C2: We are equally beholden as apes and centipedes to biological drives
We see this way how vague the premises are.
Tallis gets into the trouble here that many get into (even "materialists") when they refer to humans "just" being material. That is vague, and of limited descriptive value without added information. It is also misleading. "just" is being used, presumably, in a connotation to indicate "to the exclusion of anything else." But this depends on the categories we're looking at. If the categories are material/non-material then it might be accurate to say that we are just material - but that doesn't tell us much. When he posits the premise that our brains are "just" evolved organs designed to optimitze our odds of survival (putting aside the design issue) he is just (no-pun intended) looking at a single proposed characteristic of the brain. When he refers to us being "merely" beasts he's limiting it to one category "being equally beholden to biological drives."
Framing the premises in terms of "just" and "merely" are inaccurate without clarifying the caterogies and achieve little other than ascribing a negative connotation - it again triggers an emotional reaction, suggesting that this is somewhat undesirable. Whether that is the case or not, focusing on that increases our prejudices against that result, detracting from argument.
See how the argument changes character if we tighten it up:
P1: Our sense of self and awareness derive from our brains in conjunction with the rest of our bodies, interacting with the environment.
P2: Our brains are organs which evolved at least in part because they provided a selected advantage to human species.
P3: Other animals also have brains, with varying levels of senses and awareness.
P4: Other animals' brains also evolved at least in part because they provided a selected advantage to their respective species.
C1: Human and other animals have brains that derive senses and awareness in varying degrees.
C2: Human and other animals' senses and awareness vary due to their biology.
Ok, I'll stop here for now. Will continue with the introduction in another post, but this can get the discussion started.