The Meaning of Life

[EthanT]

If I'm understanding this correctly, he is using free in a very particular way. His definition takes as its starting point the final choice. He begins after the decision is made. This hypothesis states that knowing the choice does not enable us to go back and determine how the choice was made. In that sense the choice is free from its prior inputs. Just knowing the choice does not allow us to infer how the choice was made. I agree with this completely. I don't think it in any way contradicts anything that I've said.

This isn't a statement that the variable was not affected by prior inputs – but that we can't know what they were just from looking at the variable itself. I could be mistaken, but it doesn't seem to me that this formulation makes any statement at all about how the choice was made in the first place.

Arouet, I only read this far because this is going off the mark already. This is all about light cones within relativity, so maybe reading there first would be more beneficial? For one event (A) to be able to causally effect another event (B) [i.e., both be part of a causal web], A must lie within the past light cone of event (B), meaning they are time-like separated. If A does not lie within the past light cone of B, it cannot, in any way, causally effect event (B) and the events are then said to be space-like separated. These are basic relativistic concepts. I'll re-quote what I had above:

Hence, if a variable is to be chosen freely, according to Bell’s definition, it means that the variable can only be correlated with events in its future light cone.

So, it's a very strong statement that the variable is causally un-effected by "prior inputs", as was mentioned on the Cracking the Nutshell site. In which case, Bell can't really make any statement about "how" the choice was made, because that would refer to some kind of 'causal correlation' with another event in its past light cone, which he has ruled out via his definition. This is, after all, what makes a choice free. In a way, a free choice does not have a past light cone at all, or at least it might as well not.

To a later point you made, a completely deterministic process is NOT free. It's a contradiction in terms, perhaps the most contradictory statement ever. That is the main point of what Zeilinger said and why Bell set things up the way he did.

Anyhow, if we can't get agreement here, let's just agree to disagree and move on with no hard feelings ;-)

 

[Arouet]

Arouet, I only read this far because this is going off the mark already. This is all about light cones within relativity, so maybe reading there first would be more beneficial? For one event (A) to be able to causally effect another event (B) [i.e., both be part of a causal web], A must lie within the past light cone of event (B), meaning they are time-like separated. If A does not lie within the past light cone of B, it cannot, in any way, causally effect event (B) and the events are then said to be space-like separated. These are basic relativistic concepts. I'll re-quote what I had above:

So, it's a very strong statement that the variable is causally un-effected by "prior inputs", as was mentioned on the Cracking the Nutshell site. In which case, Bell can't really make any statement about "how" the choice was made, because that would refer to some kind of 'causal correlation' with another event its past light cone, which he has ruled out via his definition. This is, after all, what makes a choice free. In a way, a free choice does not have a past light cone, at all, or at least it might as well not.

Aren't you agreeing me with here? The variable that he's looking at, being the initial setup of the experimental apparatus, is post choice. Like you say (and like I said), Bell isn't saying anything about how the choice was made. And knowing the details of the initial setup does not allow us to go back and track what happened before.

I quoted from Bell directly. He explains what he means explicitly: the values of the variable (the initial set-up) gives us no information about what occurred before. As I said, he's not saying anything about how the choice was made - but how the choice was made is where the will is, and that's where we're concerned about whether the will was free or not. If his formula here starts post choice then how does this formula help us figure out if the choice was free or must be free in order to do science?

I'm open to being wrong here, but it's not helpful to refer to what someone else said - perhaps you could explain how you read what I quoted from Bell himself.

And by ignoring the rest of what I wrote you ignore my discussion of what Bell says his actual conclusion is!

To a later point you made, a completely deterministic process is NOT free. It's a contradiction in terms, perhaps the most contradictory statement ever. That is the main point of what Zeilinger said and why Bell set things up the way he did.

I never said it was free. Nor did Bell. What Bell wrote was that it was "effectively free for the purpose at hand". This isn't my conclusion, it is Bell's conclusion. That is why I'm arguing that he's looking at this issue more practically than theoretically. From what I can dicipher. Did you read the entire article? It's only three pages.

Anyhow, if we can't get agreement here, let's just agree to disagree and move on with no hard feelings ;-)

You're under no obligation to continue the discussion if you don't wish to, but this discussion is just getting started isn't it? The reason so many discussions don't go anywhere is not because they didn't have the potential to, but that the parties don't stick with the discussion long enough to delve deep enough into the issues.

For my part I hope you stick with it awhile longer. But I understand if you wish to bow out.

 

[EthanT]

Aren't you agreeing me with here?

No, we're not in agreement.

I quoted from Bell directly. He explains what he means explicitly: the values of the variable (the initial set-up) gives us no information about what occurred before. As I said, he's not saying anything about how the choice was made - but how the choice was made is where the will is, and that's where we're concerned about whether the will was free or not. If his formula here starts post choice then how does this formula help us figure out if the choice was free or must be free in order to do science?

I responded to this already, in several different ways.

You're under no obligation to continue the discussion if you don't wish to, but this discussion is just getting started isn't it?

Well, it never really started in my opinion. We're stuck on step 1, which makes it a really un-interesting discussion for me. Let's just call it quits, it's not a productive conversation. Not a big deal.

 

[Arouet]

No, we're not in agreement.

How are we not in agreement: we both say that Bell is not saying anything about how the choice was made. That sounds like agreement.

I responded to this already, in several different ways.

Well, it never really started in my opinion. We're stuck on step 1, which makes it a really un-interesting discussion for me. Let's just call it quits, it's not a productive conversation. Not a big deal.

That's fine. These discussions can be difficult. And it can be hard to challenge one's assumptions. I would have liked to get into it more, because I'm still not clear on what you think about Bell's position that a deterministic process can be free enough for his purposes, but I guess that will wait for another day.

 

[Sciborg_S_Patel]

And it can be hard to challenge one's assumptions.

That does seem to be the problem you're having here.

 

[Sciborg_S_Patel]

Determinism runs into all sorts of incoherent ideas.

Also, the funny thing is, we talk about determinism like we know what it is. We don't. The laws of physics are just as equally valid time-reversed as they are taken forward in time. Likewise, with entropy. This is the whole mystery of the arrow of time. So, if we can't even explain why everything marches forward in time, why entropy increases forward in time, clearly we don't understand cause and effect and clearly we don't understand what determinism really means. Also, even QM is a deterministic theory. The only time it isn't, is upon measurement, which isn't even (fully) part of the laws of QM, since it can't explain collapse! So, yeah, another thing we don't understand. We don't understand determinism as a principle in nature. We don't understand randomness as a principle in nature. So, why is it so darn hard to accept free will might be a principle of nature, when it is something we seemingly experience every day .... Segway to ...

.... and, this is also why I don't bother hashing these things out on forums anymore. I provided a "way out" from the determinism/randomness dichotomy to you just recently. The view of free will under TSQM I outlined for you, takes free will as a separate principle from cause and effect. In other words, it's not part of the web of cause and effect you refer to. If it was, it would NOT be free. That's the whole point. Anyhow, it's a pretty serious argument about free will, but I guess you'd rather not consider it.

I think rather than try and find a "way out" of determinism/randomness it makes more sense to show how that dichotomy is an impoverished account of causation.

Really I've yet to see anyone on this board explain why these are the only options - just seems a faith-based conclusion to me?

 

[Arouet]

That does seem to be the problem you're having here.

Indeed! I agree completely. It's hard for everyone, myself included. Not just in this discussion, but in every discussion. It never gets any easier. I recognize that which is why I really hoped Ethan would stick with the discussion and continue to probe at my understanding. And vice versa. That's why I want people to critique what I've written, and keep with the discussion as we work through the issues. It is tremendously difficult to do on one's own.

To break through those barriers requires commitment and cooperation. But if both parties are willing, I believe that they can make great strides. They just have to commit to working through the hard parts, and resist one's instincts to give up or ignore certain points.

There are going to be inevitable periods of frustration in such discussions. But I believe the goal is worthwhile and that if the parties stick through it, they each will benefit.

 

[Arouet]

I think rather than try and find a "way out" of determinism/randomness it makes more sense to show how that dichotomy is an impoverished account of causation.

Really I've yet to see anyone on this board explain why these are the only options - just seems a faith-based conclusion to me?

That would be awesome! Please do!

 

[politicaljunkie]

I had no idea entropy could work in reverse under physical law. I appreciate the education EthanT :) I think two things are certain. One it is incredible to alive and to try and comprehend this stuff. Second, for all our great achievements, we're basically super evolved apes scrambling in the dark with a lit torch.

 

[EthanT]

Indeed! I agree completely. It's hard for everyone, myself included. Not just in this discussion, but in every discussion. It never gets any easier. I recognize that which is why I really hoped Ethan would stick with the discussion and continue to probe at my understanding. And vice versa. That's why I want people to critique what I've written, and keep with the discussion as we work through the issues. It is tremendously difficult to do on one's own.

Arouet, if it makes you feel better, this would be an awesome discussion in person. I just suck at typing and it takes a lot of time to make a post (time that is hard to find). In addition, I don't really like communicating over computers, phones, texting ,etc. It's not that it's not interesting, there are so many subtleties, it's tortuous to try and go through it in any other way than face to face (for me, anyhow). As far as assumptions, I've read large chunks of Bell's text before (every physics student with an inclination towards QT probably has) It doesn't challenge my assumptions - the physics is a big part of what formed them in the first place! It's just the method of communication that is challenging for me.

I think rather than try and find a "way out" of determinism/randomness it makes more sense to show how that dichotomy is an impoverished account of causation.

Really I've yet to see anyone on this board explain why these are the only options - just seems a faith-based conclusion to me?

Sci, that's another thing I like about TSQM (yeah, I know, I can't go a post w/o bringing it up, lol) The way it throws in the retro-causal aspects starts to provide a richer view of causality and makes the view of causality under determinism look banal and impoverished, in comparison, imho.

Look a few posts up (but a few down from the one you quoted), I think I provided a pretty good out to the dichotomy. Please tell me at least you think so! Damn psi-proponents won't even give me any points :)

 

[Max_B]

Arouet, if it makes you feel better, this would be an awesome discussion in person. I just suck at typing and it takes a lot of time to make a post (time that is hard to find). In addition, I don't really like communicating over computers, phones, texting ,etc. It's not that it's not interesting, there are so many subtleties, it's tortuous to try and go through it in any other way than face to face (for me, anyhow). As far as assumptions, I've read large chunks of Bell's text before (every physics student with an inclination towards QT probably has) It doesn't challenge my assumptions - the physics is a big part of what formed them in the first place! It's just the method of communication that is challenging for me.



Sci, that's another thing I like about TSQM (yeah, I know, I can't go a post w/o bringing it up, lol) The way it throws in the retro-causal aspects starts to provide a richer view of causality and makes the view of causality under determinism look banal and impoverished, in comparison, imho.

Look a few posts up (but a few down from the one you quoted), I think I provided a pretty good out to the dichotomy. Please tell me at least you think so! Damn psi-proponents won't even give me any points :)

It seems to me that patterns (space-time) in the present might become coherent with alike future patterns.

That is, that such patterns are additive, summing both past patterns, and to some degree future patterns, to tip the scales... it may be but microseconds... but it may allow an organism to navigate forward, and provide a better explanation for motivation - especially as it often encompasses what organisms are good at doing. It also suggests that dreaming produces a state of greater coherence than wakefulness - as experiences are consolidated for future use.

All that said, I don't personally find that weak measurement type stuff as recently popularised by Aharonov etc., as contributing *anything* to these ideas at all. It has been clear for yonks that a measurement affects future measurements, and it either does that or it doesn't, and weak measurements don't in my view. That is when something is summed into space-time (patterns) and can then be used to predict future patterns.

Problem being that future patterns don't yet generally exist in the present, hence any summing is vaguer and uncertain, summing over bits of patterns, and the more future patterns deviate from present patterns... the less they may contribute to tipping the scales.

 

[Stephen Wright]

I would have liked to get into it more, because I'm still not clear on what you think about Bell's position that a deterministic process can be free enough for his purposes, but I guess that will wait for another day.

Arouet I don't know that there is a single deterministic process in the universe, if one measures the uncertainty in ANY outcome of ANY process. There is a range of outcomes and a range of margin of error .

When an experiment is designed, (DoE) with an expert eye on data-gathering, recording a perfectly repetitive response is never expected. Bell and John Von Neumann are perfectly clear - the creation of an experimental set-up is a naturally creative event.

 

[Arouet]

Arouet I don't know that there is a single deterministic process in the universe, if one measures the uncertainty in ANY outcome of ANY process. There is a range of outcomes and a range of margin of error.

Sure, that's what QM shows. We know that classical mechanics is a close approximation but not completely accurate. This is consistent with the position I've set out above.

When an experiment is designed, (DoE) with an expert eye on data-gathering, recording a perfectly repetitive response is never expected. Bell and John Von Neumann are perfectly clear - the creation of an experimental set-up is a naturally creative event.

I don't think I mentioned naturally creative events, neither am I familiar with the term so I'm not sure if this is related to what I wrote. I linked to the paper I'm referring to above. It didn't mention that. Might be easier if you point out which specific part you think I've misinterpreted.

The issue isn't whether mechanics are probalistic, as I said to Ethan above, we're not living in a classical world anymore. We're not talking about billiard balls. I accept the probalistic nature, at least as far as we understand it today. That's the starting point. And to be clear when I say the mix of determined and random, I'm including the probabilities demonstrated in QM. It's just a bit wordy to include a full description every time.

So again, we're starting with uncertainty and probability. That alone doesn't get you to "free will" though, from what I can see. Not in the way that people think of free will. That doesn't exclude the possibility of finding it in there somewhere but I think more is needed. As I said, there's a gap in the argument that needs to be filled from what I can see.

 

[EthanT]

All that said, I don't personally find that weak measurement type stuff as recently popularised by Aharonov etc., as contributing *anything* to these ideas at all. It has been clear for yonks that a measurement affects future measurements, and it either does that or it doesn't, and weak measurements don't in my view.

The cool thing about TSQM is not what I bolded above, but rather that future measurements can reach back and effect an intermediate measurement in the past. That's the retro-causal aspects of the formulation. Aharanov actually proposed this back in the 60's, IIRC. It's getting popular now, because of added value in explaining modern-day experiments, as well as its utility. See what I said above about alternative formulations and how they can provide added insight/utility, using a well-known and generally accepted example from classical physics.

I'll just stress again that we don't know for sure if the picture of reality TSQM seems to paint is really what reality is actually like. The experiments that seem to exhibit this strange retrocausal-like behavior can also be explained with regular linear-time QM, but the explanations are much more complicated. Let go of linear time and explanations (for some experiments) can start to look more parsimonious using TSQM. Again, alternative formulations can come in handy.

 

[Max_B]

The cool thing about TSQM is not what I bolded above, but rather that future measurements can reach back and effect an intermediate measurement in the past. That's the retro-causal aspects of the formulation. Aharanov actually proposed this back in the 60's, IIRC. It's getting popular now, because of added value in explaining modern-day experiments, as well as its utility. See what I said above about alternative formulations and how they can provide added insight/utility, using a well-known and generally accepted example from classical physics.

I'll just stress again that we don't know for sure if the picture of reality TSQM seems to paint is really what reality is actually like. The experiments that seem to exhibit this strange retrocausal-like behavior can also be explained with regular linear-time QM, but the explanations are much more complicated. Let go of

As I said, I don't find any value in weak measurement type ideas... or retrocausal explanations for experiments.

 

[Stephen Wright]

The cool thing about TSQM is not what I bolded above, but rather that future measurements can reach back and effect an intermediate measurement in the past. That's the retro-causal aspects of the formulation. Aharanov actually proposed this back in the 60's, IIRC. It's getting popular now, because of added value in explaining modern-day experiments, as well as its utility. See what I said above about alternative formulations and how they can provide added insight/utility, using a well-known and generally accepted example from classical physics.

I'll just stress again that we don't know for sure if the picture of reality TSQM seems to paint is really what reality is actually like. The experiments that seem to exhibit this strange retrocausal-like behavior can also be explained with regular linear-time QM, but the explanations are much more complicated. Let go of linear time and explanations (for some experiments) can start to look more parsimonious using TSQM. Again, alternative formulations can come in handy.

Ethan,

Thanks for the presentation of TSQM ideas. I found them very interesting. Is there a different viewpoint on the dual slit experiment TSQM vs QM?

 

[EthanT]

Ethan,

Thanks for the presentation of TSQM ideas. I found them very interesting. Is there a different viewpoint on the dual slit experiment TSQM vs QM?

Stephen, glad to hear! I'm not sure on the dual slit experiment, but it seems like it should have something to say about at least the delayed-choice setups. Never looked into that, though, but you have me intrigued now!

I think the insight I liked the most on dual-slit experiments is the notion that the field is fundamental, with waves and particles just being particular manifestations of a field. Fields are spread across space (and time), so with the dual slit experiment, the field encompasses both slits, but when we make a measurement we force a localized interaction with the field, which manifests as a particle (the smallest, characteristic blip of energy a quantum field can come in) at this, or that slit.

Somewhat interesting paper on those ideas:

https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4616

 

[malf]

Bell and John Von Neumann are perfectly clear - the creation of an experimental set-up is a naturally creative event.

To step away from the hard physics into day-to-day life for one moment, there are educational strategies that have been shown to teach (program?) children to think and problem solve in more creative ways.

Could creativity be an epiphenomenon?

 

[Arouet]

Arouet,

How about instead of trying to reach agreement point by point, I'll just provide a quick summary on my views and you can take from it what you will (freely, even).

First, the TSQM argument assumes three principles as axioms:

(1) Causality
(2) (A subtle type of) Retrocausation
(3) Genuine Free Will

With the main point being, these three principles seem mutually exclusive to each other, perhaps impossible to co-exist in nature. What TSQM shows is that the way nature allows them to exist harmoniously, is by appearing probabilistic at some level, exactly as we find in quantum theory.

This is powerful. It provides a possible answer to why nature would appear probabilistic - a vexing mystery for almost a century. And, it is intimately tied to the existence of free will/choice.

So I've been doing a bit of reading on this. There are few points worth commenting on but lets start with how they deal with free-will. Is it not a bit squirly? Here's the paper: New Insights on Time-Symmetry in Quantum Mechanics. I've read through the whole thing but I'd like to focus on section 5 "Discussion of big questions and major unknowns concerning time-symmetry".

Up to that point we've had a lengthy explanation of the math and how it works both ways, as well as measurements that can be done, including weak-measurements. They naturally raise the question "since the weak-measurement result √ 2 was “obtained” at a time arbitrarily earlier than the post-selection time, couldn’t we then ascertain that a future post-selection should produce σy = +1, seemingly in violation of causality?"

Their solution is to just assume that the weak measurements are errors. Because If this were not true, then the outcome of a weak-measurement would force us to perform a particular post-selection (seemingly in violation of our free-will)". Isn't this an altogether unsatisfactory resolution? They must conclude this only because they are assuming free-will axiomatically, as you noted. But if what the rest of what they've said is true, then shouldn't they conclude that their theory provides a problem for free-will, rather than concluding their measurements must be wrong because "it just can't be so!"

Maybe I'm missing something. But given that they start with an assumption of free-will, and contort their results to fit that assumption, I'm not sure how valuable this is as a demonstration of genuine free-will.

They go on to define free-will as "that the past may define the future, yet after this future effect takes place, i.e. after it becomes past, then it cannot be changed: we are free from the past, but, in this picture, we are not necessarily free from the future. Therefore, not knowing the future is a crucial requirement for the existence of free-will. In other words, the destinyvector cannot be used to inform us in the present of the result of our future free choices." If I'm reading it correctly, this is again contorting the interpretation of the math to fit the definition of free-will rather than to say that we can conclude there is free-will based on what we see in the math.

They go into an example of a prophet that can be accurate so long as he doesn't tell the person his prediction. They conclude "we are still free to make decisions based on nothing but the past and our own mind". This seems to make the error of considering our mind to be separate from the past. But our thought deliberations are part of the past! So this then reduces the statement to "make decisions based on nothing but the past."

What prevents us from acting in conjunction with the prediction, they write, is the possibility that the weak measurement is in error.

"Only in the future, when all the measurements are finished and we actually make the post-selection, can we retrospectively conclude whether the eccentric-weak-value shown by the measuring-device was either an error, or a real result due to the concrete post-selection. Again, the conditions for a weak-measurements require a high probability of experimental error.
From this we conclude that our prophet, the post-selected vector coming from the future, does not tell us the information we need to violate our freewill, and we are still free to decide what kind of future measurements to conduct. Therefore, free-will survives."​

I dunno, but this seems rather strained, and far from perfect coexistence.

The co-existence of bilateral arrows of time and the convergence of their probabilities doesn't seem connected to free-will at all. Free-will doesn't seem to play a part in the calculations at all, except to tell us that some of our measurements must be wrong!

I've read a few other articles on this, and the consistent thing with all of them is that none of them take even a cursory look at how our choices get made. There is no consideration of information processing, calculation, information analysis, deliberation, word and concept retrieval. What it means to make a decision and how we go about it doesn't seem to factor into it at all. When they are talking about the choice of experiment they are talking about the final experimental setup, not the thought process that went into the decision. And as Bell recognized, the decision could be taken by a pseudo RNG and still have the same effect!

From what I can tell, non of these theories are really theories of free-will. Rather they try and integrate the concept of free-will into the theory but without really discussing what free will entails or how it could work.

Or perhaps I'm missing something. I would appreciate comments.

 

[Sciborg_S_Patel]

Sci, that's another thing I like about TSQM (yeah, I know, I can't go a post w/o bringing it up, lol) The way it throws in the retro-causal aspects starts to provide a richer view of causality and makes the view of causality under determinism look banal and impoverished, in comparison, imho.

Look a few posts up (but a few down from the one you quoted), I think I provided a pretty good out to the dichotomy. Please tell me at least you think so! Damn psi-proponents won't even give me any points :)

Hey Ethan,

I'm following along as much as my weakened physics memories let me. I'll try to write some coherent commentary at some point. :-)