But this would then require an explanation for why a certain arrangement of atoms would have a singular experience while other atoms don't. As Nagel notes in Mind & Cosmos:
So it's not just that we can describe things in two ways, it's that these are two manifestly different ways. While taking a dual-aspect approach might avoid the question of Dualism, it leaves open the question of which -mind or matter - is more fundamental.
Let's assume Idealism is false so consciousness isn't solely fundamental, though not all physicists would agree*.
You can say both are equally fundamental or come from some third "stuff" but that still opens the doors it seems Carroll wants to keep close (for those interested -> see Pauli's
Neutral Monism or
David Bohm Implicate Order to name two physicists.)
Taking the approach that it's just matter...If we say the conscious experience reduces to matter, but don't have an explanation of how to take the qualitative 1st person and put it in terms of the third person quantitative....then as per Nagel why would we think this assertion of materialism is true? In fact this inability to give even a sketch as to how to solve this problem is why we have a "Hard Problem" in the first place++.
Even if were willing to accept feeling is something matter manages via a something-from-nothing miracle there still remains the question of Intentionality and Rationality. (
See Fodor's Trinity.)
Of course there are issues with the question of what is matter which have been noted up-thread - Does it move back and forth in time? Does it have inherent spatial character/coordinates at any given time? Does it move randomly of its own volition at a certain particle level?
*
Amit Goswami,
Ulrich Morhroff, &
Richard Conn Henry come to mind.
++For more on this those interested can check out Clifton's
Empirical Cast Against Materialism.