Why Steven Novella is wrong... again

[conceptualinertia]

Because it assumes that design is a more powerful way to get to complexity than accumulating these complexities through random interactions.

An assumption that becomes even more nonsensical is if we consider that design itself is a process that comes to solutions through the random interactions of neurons and the accumulated complexities of biological, cultural, and technological evolution.

Design is a powerful way to get to complexity by definition. That isn't an assumption it is what the word means and something that we experience as being true on a near daily basis. Your reason for the assumption being nonsensical is circular.

 

[conceptualinertia]

Just my two cents here. Analogies such as the TV receiver, or other popular ones such as consciousness being the driver of a car (the brain), fail hard because they rely upon utterly mechanistic concepts. It reminds me a bit of the watchmaker argument, citing human design as an example of a designed universe. It's a bit odd. I understand that there may simply not be an analogy that works, given the unique complexity of consciousness. But using analogies based on purely physical models doesn't bring us one iota closer to understanding how the separation might work. I don't even think pointing out flaws in the analogy is worth it to begin with.

It seems to me that consciousness analogies are very different from the watchmaker argument. The former are really metaphors to give the listener or reader an ability to grasp the paradigm. The latter is an argument that the aspect of human designed objects that allows us to determine that they were designed is also present in animals or the universe in general such that we can assume that the animals or the universe was designed.

 

[Max_B]

Keep in mind that prosthesis have demonstrated the ability to access previously obstructed memories, which becomes more interesting when one starts using what appear to be loss of memory conditions as argument points as in the start of this thread.

I'm finding that a fiendishly difficult paper to understand, but I've noticed you've brought it up a few times in threads, so I'm going to spend some time trying to digest it, because it seems like its important.

Although it looks like I first need to try and understand earlier papers explaining 'Delayed Non Match to Sample' memory tasks, and also what that MK801 blocking agent does. I'll keep plugging away at it.

 

[malf]

The struggle to find a difference is because my view -- as any view that has the potential to be right -- explains all aspects of reality that materialism seems to explain. It couldn't be different, otherwise my view would be demonstrably wrong. But not only are there certain aspects of reality that, I believe, my view explains better, the implications of my view are also different than materialism's. For starters, if consciousness -- that subjective feeling of being a witness that you have right now -- is irreducible, it won't ever disappear. If the brain is the partial image of a process of consciousness localisation, then dissolution of the brain means consciousness de-localisation (de-clenching). If empirical reality is a manifestation of consciousness itself, then it somehow reflects what it means to be conscious, in the same way that the sounds of a guitar string reflect what it means to be a guitar string; in other words, there is meaning to be found in reality.

I am personally not sure this is all good news. A large part of me finds materialism very comforting: all my problems will supposedly end not too long from now, inevitably; all suffering will stop; there is a panic button if things get too tough; it all ends in eternal sleep (I love sleeping); and there is no point in stressing about living a meaningful life, because meaning is an illusion anyway... so relax and enjoy. I like all this a lot... the problem is, I can't for the life of me believe it.

I was with you a fair way through this. There's a couple of big "ifs" in that first paragraph but that's fair enough, as an agnostic I'm all for "ifs" ;). (As an aside, I can't help thinking that if you employed your imagination, inventiveness and skill with language in a different direction, you would be able to mount an equally strong defense of materialism. Maybe another blog someday?:))

Then you mentioned "meaning" and I was a little lost again. I fail to see how one can define "meaning" under this model, or why this model offers more "meaning" than any other.

 

[JCearley]

I'm finding that a fiendishly difficult paper to understand, but I've noticed you've brought it up a few times in threads, so I'm going to spend some time trying to digest it, because it seems like its important.

Although it looks like I first need to try and understand earlier papers explaining 'Delayed Non Match to Sample' memory tasks, and also what that MK801 blocking agent does. I'll keep plugging away at it.

Essentially one of the teams performed a "manual brain scan" which consisted of recording the electrical inputs and outputs of tissue samples, which allows them to produce a prosthetic which mimmicks the same responses. In one test they gave lab creatures cocaine which showed a marked decrease in test performance, while another group which had both the debilitating substance and the prosthesis showed equal-or-higher performance on the test. So by essentially forcing the original circuits to fire again, the test subjects appeared to be able to access their "obstructed" memories.

I'm not sure such a prosthetic is an ideal solution in the long-term though, pre-programmed silica isn't going to have any elements of neuropalsticity to it. It might however be good enough to jump start a damaged brain back in to working order by getting the original synapses to fire again though.

 

[Max_B]

Essentially one of the teams performed a "manual brain scan" which consisted of recording the electrical inputs and outputs of tissue samples, which allows them to produce a prosthetic which mimmicks the same responses. In one test they gave lab creatures cocaine which showed a marked decrease in test performance, while another group which had both the debilitating substance and the prosthesis showed equal-or-higher performance on the test. So by essentially forcing the original circuits to fire again, the test subjects appeared to be able to access their "obstructed" memories.

I'm not sure such a prosthetic is an ideal solution in the long-term though, pre-programmed silica isn't going to have any elements of neuropalsticity to it. It might however be good enough to jump start a damaged brain back in to working order by getting the original synapses to fire again though.

Yeah, I got the outline, but it's the detail that interests me. I want to understand why the sample response in these DNMS tasks is somehow predictive of the success of the non-match response, and why cell firing during the former appears to be more critical than the latter as far as correlations with errors goes? These factors are only mentioned and referenced in the paper, but don't seem to be discussed.

I also want to understand why disruption to brain function (apparently schizophrenia like) caused by the infusion of MK801 to this area of the brain could be significantly reversed by simply replaying the firing pattern in 16 metal wires at the same moment of the task in which they were recorded previously. This replayed firing pattern didn't even bring functioning back to pre-infused control levels. I'm also unsure how the MK801 infusion could be kept so localised.

Another issue I'd like to clear up, is why the authors believe they are blocking and unblocking memory. I can't yet quite understand why they are so sure that MK801 is blocking memory, rather than simply causing a behavior like disruption. Anyway, I'll keep digging at it over the next few weeks.

 

[Bernardo Kastrup]

I was with you a fair way through this. There's a couple of big "ifs" in that first paragraph but that's fair enough, as an agnostic I'm all for "ifs" ;). (As an aside, I can't help thinking that if you employed your imagination, inventiveness and skill with language in a different direction, you would be able to mount an equally strong defense of materialism. Maybe another blog someday?:))

:)

Then you mentioned "meaning" and I was a little lost again. I fail to see how one can define "meaning" under this model, or why this model offers more "meaning" than any other.

If consciousness is generated by particular arrangements of matter, then "we" are a derivative phenomenon. As such, understanding (i.e. extracting meaning from) the fundamental nature of reality doesn't provide meaning to human life, for we are just a (possibly accidental) result.

But if consciousness is irreducible, all nature being a manifestation of it, then "we" are fundamental. As such, understanding (i.e. extracting meaning from) the fundamental nature of reality directly unveils the meaning of "us" and our lives.

 

[Arouet]

If consciousness is generated by particular arrangements of matter, then "we" are a derivative phenomenon. As such, understanding (i.e. extracting meaning from) the fundamental nature of reality doesn't provide meaning to human life, for we are just a (possibly accidental) result.

But if consciousness is irreducible, all nature being a manifestation of it, then "we" are fundamental. As such, understanding (i.e. extracting meaning from) the fundamental nature of reality directly unveils the meaning of "us" and our lives.

Let's break that down.

If matter is fundamental, there is this matter-stuff that combines and shifts around to produce a variety of patterns, some of which include the groupings we identify as "us".

If consciousness is fundamental there is this consciousness-stuff that organises somehow to produce a variety of things, some of which include the groupings we identify as "us".

In each case "we" are made up of a subset of the fundamental "stuff".

Sure in the consciousness version the "us" groupings may hold together a little longer in some respects - though not necessarily, nor in the same way or form, or perhaps at all given that it would depend on the organising principles of the stuff whether it gets moved around by a universal consciousness or something else.

As for "meaning" - if its meaning in the sense that I think of it: as the value of my experiences to myself then the versions of us that continue in the consciousness as fundamental would have meaning for longer - in that I would have experiences for longer.

If its meaning in terms of being part of some universal consciousness' overarching plan - I'm not sure why that has intrinsic value or meaning - it just simply is. Some experiences will be valuable and meaningful, others won't be - I'm not sure whether that would be significantly different depending on what the fundamental stuff is.

 

[Bernardo Kastrup]

Let's break that down.

If matter is fundamental, there is this matter-stuff that combines and shifts around to produce a variety of patterns, some of which include the groupings we identify as "us".

If consciousness is fundamental there is this consciousness-stuff that organises somehow to produce a variety of things, some of which include the groupings we identify as "us".

In each case "we" are made up of a subset of the fundamental "stuff".

Sure in the consciousness version the "us" groupings may hold together a little longer in some respects - though not necessarily, nor in the same way or form, or perhaps at all given that it would depend on the organising principles of the stuff whether it gets moved around by a universal consciousness or something else.

'Us' in this case is our most fundamental subjectivity, the witness without a story, which we subconsciously identify with; it's not our egos or personal identities. Here is a passage of my book that explains what this 'witness without a story' is:

...you have always had the same sense of ‘I’ throughout your life, even though everything else has changed: your body has changed, your thoughts and opinions have changed, your memories have changed, your self-image has changed, the world around you has changed, etc. Even though very few – if any – atoms in your body today are the same as when you were a child, you still believe yourself to be that same person. This happens because there has been a continuity of the sense of ‘I’ from the time you were a child up until now. The formless witness has remained the same.

Your argument centres on egos, personal identities. If that were what I had meant by "us," you would be correct. But, in my worldview, our personal identities are just stories. Our true subjective being, irreducible and fundamental, is what lies behind all stories.

As for "meaning" - if its meaning in the sense that I think of it: as the value of my experiences to myself then the versions of us that continue in the consciousness as fundamental would have meaning for longer - in that I would have experiences for longer.

I guess I agree, but I am afraid I didn't really understand the point you were trying to make.

If its meaning in terms of being part of some universal consciousness' overarching plan - I'm not sure why that has intrinsic value or meaning - it just simply is. Some experiences will be valuable and meaningful, others won't be - I'm not sure whether that would be significantly different depending on what the fundamental stuff is.

I didn't mean it necessarily in the context of teleology. I meant 'meaning' to be what is connoted -- as opposed to denoted -- by life in the world. If life only has denotations, implying nothing other than its own direct appearances, then there is no meaning. If life has connotations, implying something ineffable about its own nature, then there is meaning to be extracted through subtle interpretation. According to materialism, there are only denotations (i.e. all is literal). According to my formulation of idealism, there are connotations in the sense that nature reflects something about the nature of mind, since it is mind's manifestation. There is something to be interpreted about nature and, because we fundamentally are that nature, about ourselves.

There will be a passage from the book published on Reality Sandwich today that will cover this ground. I will put a link here as soon as it is out. I think it will help clarify what I mean. Alex and I also discussed this in an interview that should be published in a few weeks.

 

[Hjortron]

I am personally not sure this is all good news. A large part of me finds materialism very comforting: all my problems will supposedly end not too long from now, inevitably; all suffering will stop; there is a panic button if things get too tough; it all ends in eternal sleep (I love sleeping); and there is no point in stressing about living a meaningful life, because meaning is an illusion anyway... so relax and enjoy. I like all this a lot... the problem is, I can't for the life of me believe it.

While I know that this is a common perception of what death entails from a materialistic perspective, I don't think it's properly thought through.

If the brain creates consciousness, and when the brain dies, consciousness ends, then what follows isn't "eternal sleep", for there is no time or duration to be experienced in a true "nothingness", so it can't last forever just like it can't last 0,037 seconds or 10^100 years. What would happen instead is much likely to be that you cease to exist in one body as a conscious personality, and "wake up" as another consciousness is spawning in another body and personality somewhere and sometime else. The "in between", no matter how many eons it lasts from the perspective of what we supposedly call objective reality, would be quicker than instantaneous from any subjective perspective. You are conscious entity A, and when that ends (if we suppose it's possible), then "you" are conscious entity B, although you have no connection to being the conscious entity A anymore.

If death is the end as predicted by materialism, then death is reincarnation without any memory or connection to the previous life. And there is no comfort to be found in such an idea. As the old joke goes, "To the depressed Buddhist, suicide is just a temporary solution to a permanent problem."

 

[Bernardo Kastrup]

If death is the end as predicted by materialism, then death is reincarnation without any memory or connection to the previous life.

I cannot see how this can possibly follow from materialism. I am not even sure what you say is coherent: what definition of 'you' do you assume when you say that 'you' just become another consciousness?

 

[Bucky]

As the old joke goes, "To the depressed Buddhist, suicide is just a temporary solution to a permanent problem."

I might have lived under a rock for 40 years, but this is new to me ... nice one :D

 

[Sciborg_S_Patel]

Let's break that down.

If matter is fundamental, there is this matter-stuff that combines and shifts around to produce a variety of patterns, some of which include the groupings we identify as "us".

If consciousness is fundamental there is this consciousness-stuff that organises somehow to produce a variety of things, some of which include the groupings we identify as "us".

In each case "we" are made up of a subset of the fundamental "stuff".

I think this touches on what Braude calls the "Small is Beautiful Obsession". Yes, it's possible that idealism requires a combination of conscious entities, as Hoffman assumed when he derived some fundamental QM equations while assuming the interaction of said entities produces the world.

But there's also the conception of Mind as irreducible, which as Braude notes only contradicts an assumption about reality rather than any definitive law. As Feser notes when discussing materialism's problem with explaining intentionality:

But how, the physicalist might still ask, does dualism fare any better? For as Stoljar suggests, wouldn’t any objection to a physicalist account of intentionality apply mutatis mutandis to any dualist alternative? Or as Clayton Littlejohn once objected in a remark in Victor Reppert's combox: “It seems like causal pathways in an immaterial substance would have the same content fixation problems as causal pathways in a physical substance.”

As I have said, this sort of objection seems increasingly common in contemporary philosophy of mind, but it is deeply confused. What dualist ever said anything about “causal pathways in an immaterial substance”? Stoljar and Littlejohn seem to think that what the dualist means by an immaterial substance or soul is something that is just like a material substance – and in particular, something with distinct and causally interrelated parts – only not material, but instead “made out of” some other kind of “stuff” (“ectoplasm” maybe). In short, a kind of ghostly machine, but a machine all the same. But that is precisely what dualists – whether of a Platonic, Thomistic, or Cartesian stripe – do not think the soul is. For dualists have typically held that the soul is simple or non-composite, and thus not “made out of” causally interrelated parts of any sort. That its activities cannot be modeled on those of a material substance is the whole point.

How should we think of it, then? For the Cartesian, the essence of the soul is thought, and that is the entirety of its essence. Descartes does not say: “Gee, it’s hard to see how intentionality could be explained in terms of causal relations between physical parts. I therefore postulate an immaterial substance with immaterial parts whose causal relations are capable of generating thought and intentionality.” That would imply that in addition to thought, a soul has of its nature the various parts in question and their characteristic interrelations. And that is just what Descartes denies. A Cartesian immaterial substance doesn’t generate thinking. It is thinking, and that is all that it is. For that reason, and contrary to what Stoljar assumes, the Cartesian conception of intentionality cannot possibly be open to the same objections raised against physicalism. To say “Maybe a Cartesian immaterial substance – that is to say, something which just is its activity of thinking – could, like a physical substance, exist in the absence of intentional mental states” is just incoherent. A physicalist might want to raise some other objection to the Cartesian view, but Stoljar’s tu quoque is not open to him.

 

[Hjortron]

I cannot see how this can possibly follow from materialism. I am not even sure what you say is coherent: what definition of 'you' do you assume when you say that 'you' just become another consciousness?

Imagine that materialism is correct. Imagine further that this is the minute you die. What happens now? If you think that an "eternal nothingness" follows, how exactly is it eternal from the perspective of subjectivity?

Nothingness isn't eternal, by definition. If materialism were to be true, then at death, consciousness would cease to be in one physical entity, and start to be in another. Since there can be no state of reality without consciousness (I thoroughly agree with you about monistic idealism being self-evidently correct), reality from the perspective of subjective experience would simply be forced to switch from consciousness ceasing to exist in entity A to consciousness beginning to exist in entity B.

If this still sounds incoherently to you, just review your own thoughts of how you picture yourself what is supposed to follow the death of the brain if materialists are correct from a subjective experience. People used to assume that death in this interpretation implied, in the words of Sam Harris, "an eternity of silent darkness". We've gone past the phase of thinking that it will be like a silent darkness, since neither silence nor darkness can constitute nothingness, but now it's time to take the next step - how can you argue that nothingness is eternal or lasts for any sort of duration? That would imply time or duration of some sort, and how could that possibly be said to exist in a nothingness?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If consciousness is generated by particular arrangements of matter, then "we" are a derivative phenomenon. As such, understanding (i.e. extracting meaning from) the fundamental nature of reality doesn't provide meaning to human life, for we are just a (possibly accidental) result.

I'm not sure why understanding equals extracting meaning. In any event, excellent. Now we are in a position to make our own meaning. How liberating!

But if consciousness is irreducible, all nature being a manifestation of it, then "we" are fundamental. As such, understanding (i.e. extracting meaning from) the fundamental nature of reality directly unveils the meaning of "us" and our lives.

I don't think you can understand the underlying source or nature of fundamental existants.. All you can do is model them. And, again, I'm not sure why understanding something is equivalent to extracting meaning from it, in the sense of meaning that you are looking for.

What could we discover about fundamental consciousness that would give meaning to our lives?

~~ Paul

 

[Sciborg_S_Patel]

I'm not sure why understanding equals extracting meaning. In any event, excellent. Now we are in a position to make our own meaning. How liberating!

Wasn't it always this way? I have to admit I don't really get the Big-M concept of meaning. I feel like I can almost grasp it if I consider God the Ground of Being...but it still eludes me because you'd have to have freedom to refuse...which would suggest freedom to go your own way...which means Big-M meaning must ultimately be a doorway to personal meaning-making.

OTOH, Idealism seems more amenable to personal meaning-making than materialism, if only by allowing us to be more than Sphexes. (Assuming Feser's reading of Robinson's reading Dennet is correct and up-to-date :D)

Now, Dennett, perceptive fellow that he is when he wants to be, argues in Chapter 2 of his book Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting that any purely physical system is going to be essentially sphexish. The reason is that qua physical such a system can only ever be sensitive to syntactical properties, and syntactical properties can never add up to semantic properties. Now a non-sphexish creature would have to be sensitive to semantic properties. Hence a purely physical and thus purely syntactic system is inevitably going to be a sphexish system. Dennett thinks it can at least approximate non-sphexishness, however, because a sufficiently complex “syntactic engine” will in his view at least approximate a perfect “semantic engine.” And sphexishly dogmatic materialist that he is, Dennett insists that human beings are purely physical. Hence, though we seem non-sphexish, Dennett insists that we really are sphexish, but -- being exquisitely complex syntactical engines -- in so subtle a way that for practical purposes we can treat ourselves as if we were not.

But as Howard Robinson points out in the introduction to his edited volume Objections to Physicalism, Dennett’s position is a muddle. A purely syntactical engine will not even approximate a perfect semantic engine, because it will fail to be semantic at all. Syntax by itself doesn’t get you imperfect semantics; it gets you exactly zero semantics, just as the ketchup kids use for blood at Halloween time will never get you even imperfect real blood no matter how much of it you pour out. Dennett knows this, which is why (as Robinson notes) he has to resort to the essentially instrumentalist position that our sophistication as complex syntactic engines makes it useful for us to interpret ourselves as if we were semantic engines. But this too is a muddle, for interpretation is itself an act that presupposes real semantics rather than a mere ersatz. Dennett’s further reformulations of his position (e.g. in his paper “Real Patterns”) only ever paper over this fundamental incoherence rather than resolve it, but his dogmatic materialism makes him think there must be some way to make it something other than the reductio ad absurdum that it is.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wasn't it always this way? I have to admit I don't really get the Big-M concept of meaning. I feel like I can almost grasp it if I consider God the Ground of Being...but it still eludes me because you'd have to have freedom to refuse...which would suggest freedom to go your own way...which means Big-M meaning must ultimately be a doorway to personal meaning-making.

Freedom to refuse what? The Meaning of God? What is the Meaning of God?

OTOH, Idealism seems more amenable to personal meaning-making than materialism, if only by allowing us to be more than Sphexes. (Assuming Feser's reading of Robinson's reading Dennet is correct and up-to-date :D)

Hey, why not start a thread on syntax versus semantics? I have no idea what semantics mongers like Robinson mean when they say semantics. The second paragraph you quoted says nothing except "syntax can't get you semantics."

If meaning has something to do with relationships, then that suggests that fundamental existants do not have meaning.

~~ Paul

 

[Sciborg_S_Patel]

Freedom to refuse what? The Meaning of God? What is the Meaning of God?

Well this is why Big M meaning eludes me.

Hey, why not start a thread on syntax versus semantics? I have no idea what semantics mongers like Robinson mean when they say semantics. The second paragraph you quoted says nothing except "syntax can't get you semantics."

If meaning has something to do with relationships, then that suggests that fundamental existants do not have meaning.

Well that was meant (;)) to be joke eliding the two definitions of meaning...but it is an interesting question as to how something feeling meaningful - which would seem to be a quale - would relate to, or depend on, intentionality and the idea of semantic meaning...

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Well that was meant (;)) to be joke eliding the two definitions of meaning...but it is an interesting question as to how something feeling meaningful - which would seem to be a quale - would relate to, or depend on, intentionality and the idea of semantic meaning...

I don't understand what Feser et al mean when they talk about semantics. They seem to refer to some sort of Platonic dictionary, but then they say they aren't doing that. I'm really clueless. Perhaps someone here can explain.

~~ Paul

 

[Sciborg_S_Patel]

I don't understand what Feser et al mean when they talk about semantics. They seem to refer to some sort of Platonic dictionary, but then they say they aren't doing that. I'm really clueless. Perhaps someone here can explain.

~~ Paul

Oh, that's why I put in the comment "Assuming Feser's reading of Robinson's reading [of] Dennet is correct and up-to-date" .

I fear this argument might require a good deal of back reading to really get into.