Something to keep in mind is that when Chalmers originally proposed the Hard Problem and the inadequacy of materialism, he wasn't proposing that humans had souls. In fact, he seemed to be largely convinced that qualia were epiphenomena. So originally the issue was entirely philosophical, as a useless spectator consciousness isn't any better than a biological robot. What wish could be granted by such a conception of the mind?
It's only now, decades later,
that he thinks it might be otherwise.
Let's also not forget the desperation of the "skeptical" movement, which sees immaterialism in opposition to secular humanism. There's just as much wishful thinking among materialists, something Searle & Chalmers both noted when discussing philosophy of mind:
"I believe one of the unstated assumptions behind the current batch of views is that they represent the only scientifically acceptable alternatives to the antiscientism that went with traditional dualism, the belief in the immortality of the soul, spiritualism, and so on. Acceptance of the current views is motivated not so much by an independent conviction of their truth as by a terror of what are apparently the only alternatives."
-John Searle, "What's wrong with the philosophy of mind?"
"A motivation to avoid dualism, for many, has arisen from various spiritualistic, religious, supernatural and other antiscientific overtones of the view. But those are quite inessential. A naturalistic dualism expands our view of the world, but it does not invoke the forces of darkness."
-David Chalmers, "The Conscious Mind"