Alex
Administrator
hi Laird... there is a lot of great stuff here. I particularly like to the idealism v. panpsychism critique... then again I wonder if all of this kinda falls under Mike's point about "recovering materialists."Dear Alex,
A year or two back, I wrote an extended critique of Bernardo's idealism as described in his book, "Why Materialism is Baloney [etc]", partly motivated by my implied commitment here to look into his ideas more deeply. I ended up not publishing that critique - and rightly so, I believe, having now just reread it: it was neither entirely coherent nor entirely fair to Bernardo. That said, it provides ample food for thought, and I have mined it for a series of critical questions which you might ask of the man. Of course, you need to make these questions your own so that you can, if appropriate, follow up on them in a real-time interview situation, so definitely let me know if any of them fail to make sense to you. That said, here they are:
- Bernardo, in your book, "Why Materialism is Baloney [etc]", you provide various analogies for consciousness, including: flowing water and whirlpools, liquid mirrors of mercury, and vibrating membranes. These implicitly associate mind with dimensionality. Moreover, you explicitly associate mind with dimensionality on page 139 of your book, where you write that (emphasis in the original) "we need to imagine the medium of mind as a membrane with more than two dimensions vibrating in more than three dimensions of space". Would you acknowledge that this dimensionality (of, under your scheme, consciousness/mind) implies some sort of physicality [edit: on reflection, "substantiality" might be a better word than "physicality"] to that consciousness/mind, which might, per the question two below, be reconciled from stark physicality as "mind stuff"?
- If you don't acknowledge this, then would you acknowledge that the notion that your analogies, which strongly entail dimensionality - along with your explicit admission of dimensionality, and thus some sort of physicality [edit: again, better is "substantiality"] - can ultimately be "cashed out" into a non-dimensional, non-physical reality is as promissory as the materialism that you seek to refute? If not, how would you "cash out" these analogies in a way that is both non-dimensional and non-physical? If you don't believe that your analogies need to be cashed out in this way, then why not, and how do you avoid the implication of the existence of some sort of "mind stuff" (see below question)?
- Following on from the first question (and to some extent the second), and extending / elaborating on it: would you acknowledge with respect to your position, if not the implication of physicality [substantiality], at least the implication of the existence of some sort of "stuff", which might least disruptively be described as "mind stuff"? Admittedly, you explicitly deny the implication/existence of this "mind stuff" on page 67, where you write that "Idealism does not entail that the substrate of mind is the stuff of existence, insofar as we define 'stuff' as something that exists independently, and outside of, subjective perception": this denial, though, depends on a definition of "stuff" as "independent of, and outside of, subjective perception". What if instead we define this "stuff" as the contents of subjective perception? Would this not avoid your objection, as well as properly recognise that whatever it is that you define to be mind/consciousness is in some sense tangible [substantive]: that is, that it both has a dimensional structure as well as being some sort of "stuff"?
- Following up on all of the questions so far: would you, in the end, allow that the distinction that you try to draw between idealism and panpsychism is illusory? To elaborate: on page 66, under the heading "Idealism is not panpsychism", you write that (emphasis in the original) "Idealism entails that all reality is in mind. One should not confuse the claim that all of reality is in consciousness with the idea that everything is conscious. Idealism does not entail that rocks and chairs experience things subjectively the way you and I do". The two primary claims of this assertion can be contested thus. Firstly, that panpsychism need not entail that everything "is" conscious any more than (your vision of) idealism need do: it can simply entail, as does (your vision of) idealism, that "mind is a fundamental feature of the world" (quote from this version of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) article on panpsychism: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/panpsychism/). Secondly, that panpsychism need not entail "that rocks and chairs experience things subjectively" any more than idealism need entail that conclusion: both might adequately explain non-conscious entities as lacking the whirlpool-like self-reflective mechanisms that you propose as enabling consciousness in beings such as humans.
- Following up even further: if your answer to the previous question is negative, then how would you respond to this quote from the same SEP article as referenced in the previous question: "Idealists are panpsychists by default, as it were, believing as they do that nothing exists except minds or mental attributes"?
- Finally, this question is in the spirit of synthesis. Let's say that you do accept all of the (implications of the) preceding question-challenges, and that you acknowledge that (your vision of) idealism is - or could be reasonably conceived as being - panpsychism by another name: what do you think of the prospect of similarly embracing dualism as merely another aspect of this - perhaps universal - perspective on the mind-body problem?
Alex, I have composed all of this fairly rapidly because I don't know how much time you have left before your interview. I might post amendments/additions if time allows. Please feel free to share any/all of it with Bernardo prior to interviewing him, and to involve me in that communication if/as you see fit.
Warmly, and fruitfully,
Laird
do you think you could find a vid clip that hones in on the idealism v. panpsychism thing? I can then use that to get to yr question.