New Galen Strawson paper.

[Kai]

I think you're underestimating the combination problem. Why should qualia be divisible, when one of the primary reasons the Hard Problem is hard is that we have qualitative experiences for whom a reductionist model cannot even be sketched out?

I don't necessarily think that contexts of experience are divisible. For example, to see color, I maintain that you need a physical system complex enough for that kind of experience to operate. But that doesn't mean it's divisible. It doesn't mean, for example, than an electron can "see," let alone see color. Indeed, I would find such a claim largely incoherent. I just think that something like an electron has a much more basic texture of experience. Of course it doesn't have taste and smell and those things, because it is not a system complex enough to sponsor those experiential activities. Just as we are not complex enough to sponsor activities that may yet exist in the future of evolution.

As for first person perspectives of primitive entia, why would we think they have first person experiences? And why would their interaction make a new first person entity? Experiences happen to a first person macro-entity, intentionality is also focused on similar beings (us humans at the least). Neither seems amenable to reductionism, though on the flip-side neither seems wholly divorced from physical biological beings. To suddenly claim that something like consciousness, which is first-person centric, is somehow spread across the universe (a claim by both Panpyshcism and Idealism) seems like a huge leap to me. Adding a "proto" prefix only confuses the matter further. What exactly is "proto-consciousness"? Is it like sleep, like being in a daze? What good reason do we have to believe there is such a thing?

Well, that's a circular reasoning: "experiences happen to a first person macro-entity." So far as I see it, there's no good reason to suppose that a level of experience cannot be had by every single existing system in this universe. To imagine that we are the only style of it has always struck me as profoundly anthropomorphic. The secular equivalent of theism, I guess. I also don't know what you mean by "spread across the universe." To take a simple case, basic materials are "spread across the universe" and if those are experiential systems (as I think they are) then they are likewise spread, being cospatial with the first.

Panpsychism, while having its charms, ultimately seems like a way to force an answer to huge mysteries by mashing together the mental and physical and claiming the problems of subjectivity/intentionality/rationality are solved.

I think that's Idealism you are talking about. Of course, any philosophical standpoint can be questioned. However, a couple of misconceptions in your statement: NM doesn't "mash stuff together." The world consists of one "grokness" under NM. Strawson calls it panpsychism, and that's his choice, but really his view and mine are essentially identical (so far as I can see).

I think all the paradigms are fundamentally flawed, though materialism is last place for me given the ex nihilo miracle it requires. Perhaps "souls" are the wrong word, though the above issues combined with the issue of where memories are "located" makes me think it would be unfair to say Panpsychism is necessarily superior to Idealism or Dualism. (I'm also sympathetic to some of Scholastic Metaphysics and Hylemorphism, though I think it's also a dead end. If I ever comprehend Whitehead I might go in for process philosophy...)

Well, as I said, Idealism does not give an answer for why world-stuff is the way we perceive it and has the properties it does. It also, in its form of propsing "mind" as the basis of things, if it genuinely means mind and not a bare experientiality, is guilty of massive undemonstrated assumptions, imo. Principally, the assumption that structured experiential activity can exist in the absence of physical structure. If it's really that physical structure that it's talking about, then it is in fact NM or PP.

Perhaps Panpsychism should drop the "Pan". Think of some core capable of experience and intentionality that need not tie into survival of individual living beings. These cores may simply be part of living biological systems and recycled in a genuine physical space rather than a God-dream - basically another part of the environment without extending mental properties to every bit of matter.

I think that just reinstantiates the problem of radical emergence, which is precisely where NM is superior to most other standpoints

 

[Sciborg_S_Patel]

Why should complexity be the key to new experiential textures? The appeal to cryptic complexity holds little weight IMO, as this just leads us back to the Combination Problem. I'd note it's a problem compounded by the fact that it's not clear what a "particle" is, and thus not clear there would be micro/nano/pico/femto-level entia that could be subjects of experience.

With regards to limiting subjectivity/intentionality to biological systems I think it's less anthropocentric than it is observation. There's an argument for animals have consciousness and intentionality, at least to some degree, going by the consensus of science at this time. (Possible reason to attribute higher degrees of intellect but that AFAIK depends on anecdotal evidence.) It's definitely a leap to then say everything has mental capabilities.

I don't think any paradigm explains why world-stuff is the way it is, at least not in any definitive way. It all comes either to brute fact (for example Materialism) or certain assumptions about reality that in themselves end up positing some kind of omnipotent power (for example Holistic Idealism). What in Panpsychism/NM manages to explain why natural regularities (misnamed "laws" thanks to arrogance) are what they are?

 

[Kai]

Why should complexity be the key to new experiential textures? The appeal to cryptic complexity holds little weight IMO, as this just leads us back to the Combination Problem. I'd note it's a problem compounded by the fact that it's not clear what a "particle" is, and thus not clear there would be micro/nano/pico/femto-level entia that could be subjects of experience.

I'm sorry, I don't see your point. In order to "touch" one would need to embody a system complex enough to encounter surfaces and to register sensory experiences of those surfaces. Ditto for the other senses. That is why complexity is essential for higher level experiential textures. I'm not saying it's the *only* thing involved, but I can't see that it's any less than of fundamental importance. You seem to have a fondness for the combination problem...or for the existence of a combination problem, perhaps more accurately. I am still unconvinced that such a problem really exists *(philosophically, and not pragmatically, as discussed before). I have no *real* trouble imagining that basic experiential systems can combine into complex experiential systems. I agree with Strawson on this. Philosophically, it just seems to be a non-problem. Pragmatically, of course, it's a HUGE problem, if one sets oneself the task of wanting to know the how and the detail, But really, that's a separate issue.

With regards to limiting subjectivity/intentionality to biological systems I think it's less anthropocentric than it is observation. There's an argument for animals have consciousness and intentionality, at least to some degree, going by the consensus of science at this time. (Possible reason to attribute higher degrees of intellect but that AFAIK depends on anecdotal evidence.) It's definitely a leap to then say everything has mental capabilities.

There's certainly an issue of ever being able to "prove," as humans use that word, that the nature of all existing systems is experiential. But the fact is, that is ultimately of no great traction with respect to the possibility that it is so nonetheless. Moreover, the problem is not any smaller than "proving" that any systems whatever entirely lack experientiality. In the NM view, we start from something we already know exists (experience). The materialist position starts from something we don't even know exists at all: nonexperience.

I don't think any paradigm explains why world-stuff is the way it is, at least not in any definitive way. It all comes either to brute fact (for example Materialism) or certain assumptions about reality that in themselves end up positing some kind of omnipotent power (for example Holistic Idealism). What in Panpsychism/NM manages to explain why natural regularities (misnamed "laws" thanks to arrogance) are what they are?

Well I agree with you here. All ontologies reduce to a brute assertion. And yet, the world IS, so something must be true of it. We CAN examine some of these brute assertions and discover that some of them have more extravagant assumptions hidden behind the scenes than others.

 

[Haruhi]

Why not?

No, we must ask why inanimate matter must have proto-mind because among "no-mind" and "proto-mind" I only see a pun.

 

[Haruhi]

There is a reason. The extravagant magic of radical emergence as the alternative "theory."

No more extravagant than posit a proto-mind, whatever that is.

 

[Kai]

No more extravagant than posit a proto-mind, whatever that is.

Actually, radical emergence is a lot more extravagant. But then, I already covered that. Read the thread.

 

[Haruhi]

Actually, radical emergence is a lot more extravagant. But then, I already covered that. Read the thread.

No, that's just your opinion. Mine is that all these isms are equally extravagant at the end.

 

[Kai]

No, that's just your opinion. Mine is that all these isms are equally extravagant at the end.

Nope, it's not just opinion. It has to do with Occam's Razor and the number of ontic primitives assumed. This is why monism is always going to be superior to dualism, for example.

 

[Haruhi]

It is a matter of opinion, because Occam's razor has nothing to do with the truth, but only by choosing the simplest hypothesis. And if monism is simpler than dualism, dualism is more akin to common sense. Also it is not specified what kind of monism accept. And we were not talking about panpsychism, which bears no necessary relationship with monism? The panpsychism not for Occam's razor.

 

[Kai]

It is a matter of opinion, because Occam's razor has nothing to do with the truth, but only by choosing the simplest hypothesis. And if monism is simpler than dualism, dualism is more akin to common sense. Also it is not specified what kind of monism accept. And we were not talking about panpsychism, which bears no necessary relationship with monism? The panpsychism not for Occam's razor.

I don't follow this argument at all. We discover the "truth" by tools of empirics and philosophy, which is what Occam's razor is for. You argue simply because the facts are against you.

 

[Haruhi]

I don't follow this argument at all. We discover the "truth" by tools of empirics and philosophy, which is what Occam's razor is for. You argue simply because the facts are against you.

The facts against me? There is no fact in favor of panpsyquism And have you forgotten everything else, but anyway let's leave now.

 

[Kai]

quote="Kai, post: 56163, member: 110"]I don't follow this argument at all. We discover the "truth" by tools of empirics and philosophy, which is what Occam's razor is for. You argue simply because the facts are against you.

The facts against me? There is no fact in favor of panpsyquism And have you forgotten everything else, but anyway let's leave now.[/quote]

This is the problem I have with discussions with you. You simply make assertions, can't back them up, and then say something like "but I don't have any more time for this." Well, make up your mind.

 

[Haruhi]

This is the problem I have with discussions with you. You simply make assertions, can't back them up, and then say something like "but I don't have any more time for this." Well, make up your mind.

You have not tried any of my points.

 

[DasMurmeltier]

I really dont want participate in that discussion at all, but hm - when it comes to occam's razor, meh. It basically tries to reduce complexity so that those less complex theories can be tested and falsified more easily. It is NOT saying that the more complex theories are wrong and the less complex theories are right; to know anything about what is right or wrong we need other means like e.g. the scientific method.
Occams principle kinda tries to find out the truth, but it isnt saying what is true and what is not. And even when you are getting there, it isnt clearly defined what is complex and what isnt. I could define that entirely differently then everyone else here and im sure that i totally do that too.

In the end, i dont see how occam's razor is a legitimate argument since the principle alone doesnt tell us anything about what is really right or wrong. You can find out which theories are less complex from your own personal viewpoint. Doesnt make those necessarily true though.

 

[Kai]

I really dont want participate in that discussion at all, but hm - when it comes to occam's razor, meh. It basically tries to reduce complexity so that those less complex theories can be tested and falsified more easily. It is NOT saying that the more complex theories are wrong and the less complex theories are right; to know anything about what is right or wrong we need other means like e.g. the scientific method.
Occams principle kinda tries to find out the truth, but it isnt saying what is true and what is not. And even when you are getting there, it isnt clearly defined what is complex and what isnt. I could define that entirely differently then everyone else here and im sure that i totally do that too.

In the end, i dont see how occam's razor is a legitimate argument since the principle alone doesnt tell us anything about what is really right or wrong. You can find out which theories are less complex from your own personal viewpoint. Doesnt make those necessarily true though.

But in general, a simpler solution is going to be the correct one. If you find a broken window in your home, and three people offer three different reasons.

1) a kid broke it with his ball.
2) It was actually the Harlem Globetrotters passing through (the entire team).
3) God himself broke it.

The first option is almost absurdly more likely than the other two. Very, very strong reasons would be needed to offset this fact. So it is with something like dualism. How two ontic primitives could possibly interact, creates a problem less likely to exist in the first place than God breaking your window and doing a runner.

 

[Haruhi]

It was discussed panpsychism, not monism, remind you.